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The United States today faces a formidable 
generation-long challenge: to transform the economy 
from being driven primarily by fossil fuel sources of 
energy, which are the major cause of global climate 
change, to becoming an economy that can function 
effectively through renewable energy sources and by 
achieving high levels of energy efficiency. 
The project of building a clean-energy economy will 
become a powerful engine of expanding employment 
opportunities throughout the U.S. economy. Accord-
ing to a study that PERI recently completed with the 
Center for American Progress (CAP),1 clean-energy 
investments at the level of about $150 billion per 
year—i.e. around one percent of U.S. GDP—can 
generate about 1.7 million net new jobs throughout 
the U.S. economy.  
This level of annual new clean-energy investments in 
the U.S. will be strongly encouraged through the 
combination of direct government spending, along 
with the subsidies and incentives for private 
business investors that would result from the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the 
February 2009 Obama stimulus program) and the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACESA—the 
Waxman-Markey bill) now being debated in 
Congress. Within this strongly supportive policy 
framework, the advance of clean-energy techno-
logies will accelerate and markets supporting these 
technologies will mature. This will create a self-
reinforcing dynamic of rising private-sector clean-
energy investment opportunities, which in turn will 
mean expanding job opportunities.   
The building of a clean-energy economy in the United 
States can also serve another purpose: to create 
new ‘pathways out of poverty’ for the 78 million 
people in this country (roughly 25 percent of the 
population) who are presently poor or near-poor, and 
raise living standards more generally for low-income 
people in the United States. How the project of 
building a clean-energy economy can benefit low-
income people in the U.S. is the focus of this study.  
 
                                                 
1 See Pollin, Heintz, and Garrett-Peltier (2009). 
In the discussions that follow, we examine how 
investments in clean energy—including energy effici-
ency measures such as residential and commercial 
building retrofits, public transportation and a smart 
grid electrical transmission system, along with 
renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, and 
biomass power—create major new employment 
opportunities in comparison with spending equiva-
lent amounts of money within the traditional fossil 
fuel sectors, i.e. oil, natural gas and coal. We then 
assess the impact on low-income families of seeing 
their household energy bills go down as a result of 
investments in energy efficiency retrofits.  We finally 
also consider how investments in improving public 
transportation systems can reduce transportation 
costs for low-income families.   
Clean-Energy Investments Create Job Opportunities  
In general, our findings show that clean-energy in-
vestments create more job opportunities than spend-
ing on fossil fuels, across all levels of skill and edu-
cation. The largest benefits will accrue to workers 
with relatively low educational credentials.  
We further find that a high proportion of the jobs 
generated by clean-energy investments should offer 
good opportunities for advancement through training 
programs, and more generally, that newly employed 
low-income workers will see new opportunities to lift 
themselves and their families out of poverty.  
Considering a $150 billion annual level of clean-
energy investments in the U.S. economy, some of our 
major specific findings include the following:  
EXPANDING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
LOWER-INCOME WORKING PEOPLE 
  Out of the 1.7 million net increase in job creation, 
roughly 870,000 of the newly available jobs would 
be accessible to workers with high school degrees 
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  Roughly 614,000 of the newly expanded number 
of jobs available for workers with high school 
degrees or less will offer decent opportunities for 
promotions and rising wages over time. The job 
creation within this category is seven times larger 
than the number of jobs that would be created in 
this category by spending the same amount of 
money within the fossil fuel industry.  
□  To maximize opportunities for decent job 
opportunities, clean-energy investment poli-
cies need to operate in tandem with high-
quality and widely-accessible training pro-
grams; minimum wage laws that set a ‘living 
wage’ standard throughout the country; and a 
more favorable environment for union or-
ganizing among low-wage workers. 
□  The net increase of 1.7 million jobs will 
generate roughly a one percentage point fall 
in the unemployment rate. This in turn should 
raise earnings for low-income workers by 
about 2 percent. 
MORE JOBS ACROSS ALL EDUCATIONAL LEVELS  
  3.2 times more jobs overall than fossil-fuel in-
vestments  
  3.6 times more jobs requiring high school degrees 
or less  
  2.6 times more jobs requiring college degrees or 
more  
  3.0 times more jobs requiring some college  
ENERGY EFFICIENCY RETROFITS LOWER HOME 
HEATING AND UTILITY BILLS  
  Retrofits could reduce living costs by an average 
of 3-4 percent for low-income households. 
  Achieving these benefits will require well-designed 
policies to expand the market for retrofits. 
  The markets to provide retrofitting services must 
be targeted to benefit low-income renters as well 
as homeowners.  
IMPROVING PUBLIC TRANSIT REDUCES 
TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES  
  Improving public transportation in urban centers 
to about 25–50 percent of total transportation 
could lower costs and raise living standards for 
low-income households by an average of 1–4 
percent.  
  The largest benefits will accrue to households 
that can replace a car with public transit.  
  These households would see their annual trans-
portation expenditures fall by roughly $2,000.  
  This would represent a reduction in total expen-
ditures for these families of about 10 percent.  
These findings are particularly significant in the con-
text of the current energy debate because they turn 
upside-down a common objection from opponents of 
clean-energy policies: that environmental policies will 
be harmful for the poor. We show that, to the con-
trary, with effective policies in place, investing in 
clean energy can provide significant new opportuni-
ties at all levels of the U.S. economy, and especially 
for families who are poor or near-poor. INTRODUCTION 
The transformation of our fossil-fuel driven economy 
into a clean-energy economy will be the work of a 
generation, engaging a huge range of people and 
activities. But, focusing on essentials, there are three 
interrelated projects that will define the entire enter-
prise: dramatically increasing energy efficiency; 
equally dramatically lowering the cost of supplying 
energy from such renewable sources as solar, wind 
and biofuels; and mandating limits on pollution from 
burning oil, coal, and natural gas.  
Success in combining the three projects—energy effi-
ciency, renewable energy and limits on fossil fuel 
pollution—could produce a decisive environmental 
and economic victory. It could also advance eco-
nomic opportunity in the U.S. in several specific 
ways, by lessening the risks of extreme weather pat-
terns such as Hurricane Katrina, allowing us to 
breathe clean air and breaking our dependence on 
oil companies and foreign oil oligarchies. But can a 
clean-energy investment project also promote 
broader gains in economic opportunity, by expanding 
job opportunities and income security, and thereby 
fighting poverty in the United States?  
These are the questions we explore in this study. We 
examine them both in terms of the overall U.S. econ-
omy, and by focusing specifically on conditions in 41 
distinct areas throughout the country. Our conclu-
sions are clear.  
We find that a clean-energy investment agenda can 
indeed serve as a tool for expanding economic oppor-
tunity broadly throughout the country—to ‘create 
pathways out of poverty,’ as the term is frequently 
used. There are three basic channels through which 
we observe major connections between the environ-
mental agenda and a program to fight poverty   
in the United States: by significantly expanding em-
ployment opportunities, especially for people with 
relatively low formal educational credentials; by low-
ering heating and utility bills through building retro-
fits; and by increasing access to public transportation.  
Job Creation and Poverty Reduction. The most pow-
erful way in which clean-energy investments will ex-
pand economic opportunities is through the channel 
of job creation, especially by increasing the availabil-
ity of jobs for people with relatively low formal cre-
dentials. Considering the country as a whole, 
expanding overall clean-energy investments by both 
the public and private sectors by a total of about 
$150 billion per year—with the private sector ac-
counting for the bulk of new spending—can create 
about 2.5 million new jobs in the economy, as we 
have shown in the Center for American Progress 
study.2 E v e n  i f  w e  as s u m e t hat  a $ 15 0 b i l l i o n  e x -
pansion in clean-energy investments is basically 
matched by a reduction in spending in fossil fuel sec-
tors—i.e. oil, natural gas, and coal—the clean-energy 
investments will still generate a net increase in new 
employment of about 1.7 million jobs. Moreover, 
about 870,000 of net new jobs created—through the 
expansion of clean-energy investments and corre-
sponding reduction in fossil fuel spending—will be in 
jobs with relatively low educational requirements, i.e. 
a high school degree or less. This means major new 
job opportunities for people who have faced unem-
ployment or other difficulties establishing them-
selves in the labor market. The majority of these jobs 
also include good prospects for training and promo-
tions that can lead to stable, higher-paying positions 
over time. To the extent that an expansion in em-
ployment also leads to a reduction in the unemploy-
ment rate, this increases workers’ bargaining power. 
Workers should be able to gain increased wages as a 
result. Finally, these will not simply be short-term job 
opportunities, but will continue to be available as 
long as the clean-energy investment agenda pro-
ceeds over time. For example, the construction jobs 
that will open up through clean-energy investments 
will not be tied only to one or two specific projects. 
These positions will rather be sustained as long as 
construction activity is needed to build a clean-
energy economy.  
Building Retrofits for Lowering Heating and Utility 
Bills. Retrofitting the country’s existing housing stock 
could generate major reductions in the consumption 
of fossil fuels and greenhouse gas emissions. It is 
reasonable to expect that both individual-family 
homes and apartment buildings could be weather-
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
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ized such that savings on energy could amount to up 
to 4 percent of a low-income family’s annual income. 
But to achieve this level of energy efficiency in 
homes will require careful attention to making retro-
fits affordable and convenient for low-income home-
owners. Programs must also be designed so that the 
economic benefits of lowered energy costs can be 
shared equitably between renters and landlords. 
Increasing Access to Public Transportation. At pre-
sent, low-income households spend about 95 per-
cent of their transportation budget on private cars. 
This is the case even though, on a per mile basis, 
traveling by private car is more than twice as expen-
sive as public transportation. Auto travel per mile 
also generates greenhouse gas emissions at roughly 
twice the level of public transportation. Low-income 
people do not travel heavily by public transportation 
for many of the same reasons as those in higher in-
come brackets—i.e. throughout most of the country, 
public transportation is under-developed and under-
supported financially. It can also be expensive for 
poor people. As we discuss in detail below, well-
designed expansions of public transportation sys-
tems should be able to increase ridership by low-
income people in urban areas such that their public 
transportation use rises to between 25 and 50 per-
cent of their households’ total travel. Shifting toward 
this level of public transit use is capable of raising 
the living standards among low-income households 
by between 1 and 4 percent. The savings could be as 
much as 10 percent of total living costs if families 
are able to give up one car. 
Falling Fossil Fuel Production and Rising Prices 
As noted above, we are assuming that the fossil fuel 
sectors—oil, natural gas and coal—will contract at ap-
proximately the same rate that the clean-energy in-
vestment agenda expands. We recognize this is a 
worst-case scenario, and proceed deliberately from this 
most negative prospective situation regarding the fossil 
fuel industry. In fact, some emission reduction projects, 
such as installing carbon dioxide capture systems at 
coal-fired power plants and reducing methane leaks 
from natural gas pipelines, will increase, rather than 
reduce, employment in the fossil fuel sector. Nonethe-
less, we can anticipate that the benefits of clean-energy 
investments will, to some extent, be offset by job losses 
for workers in the fossil fuel sectors and harmful effects 
on communities that depend heavily on fossil fuels to 
generate employment and income.  
At present, about 4 million people in the United 
States owe their jobs to the fossil fuel industries, 
many of them in low-income families. Certainly a sig-
nificant share of these people will face difficult ad-
justments as the fossil fuel industry contracts. It is 
therefore crucial that we examine the benefits of the 
clean-energy investment agenda relative to the costs 
that will be faced by people and communities 
throughout the country as the United States reduces 
its dependence on fossil fuels. In the discussion that 
follows—just as we noted briefly above—we will be 
clear on the net effects on low-income households of 
the expansion of a clean-energy investment agenda 
alongside the concurrent decline of fossil fuel-related 
economic activities.  
It is precisely through recognizing the adjustments 
that will be faced by individual workers, families, and 
communities connected to the fossil fuel industries 
that policymakers can pursue effective interventions 
to counteract them. The American Clean Energy and 
Security Act (ACESA) as reported by the Energy and 
Commerce Committee includes a viable framework 
for addressing these concerns. ACESA includes a 
new worker transition program that provides workers 
who are laid off from energy-intensive industries an 
allowance that will cover 70 percent of their wages. 
These payments would continue for three years. 
Workers facing these circumstances will also receive 
health, training, and relocation benefits.  
The ACESA also includes further initiatives for pro-
tecting the well-being of low-income households. A 
major provision of the ACESA is to establish a man-
dated cap on carbon emissions. This measure is ex-
pected to raise the price of using oil, coal and natural 
gas. Unless low-income households are protected 
against the effects of these price increases, the im-
pact of the higher prices will reduce their living stan-
dards more than would be the case for higher-
income households. This is because energy-related 
expenditures represent a larger share of overall con-
sumption spending for these households.  
However, any such negative impacts can be effec-
tively counteracted by policies directed at shielding 
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low-income households from rising fossil fuel prices. 
The basic solution is included in the ACESA as re-
ported out of committee. This is to rebate the pro-
ceeds that result from the sale of 15 percent of the 
emissions credits associated with the carbon cap to 
low-income households through two mechanisms, a 
refundable ‘energy tax credit’ and an ‘energy refund.’ 
The most important aim would be to at least hold 
lower-income families harmless against any price 
increases for energy or energy-intensive goods gen-
erated by the cap. In evaluating these specific fea-
tures of the ACESA, the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities concluded in a letter written to Chairmen 
Waxman and Markey that: “Our estimate is that set-
ting aside 15 percent of the allowance value for re-
funds and tax credits for consumers, together with 
other provisions in the bill . . . would ensure that the 
average household in the bottom 20 percent of the 
population would not experience any reduction in the 
purchasing power of its budget” (emphasis added).3 
For the purposes of our discussion, we assume that 
this important provision will be included in any car-
bon cap that is implemented in the U.S.4 We will 
therefore proceed with our discussion assuming 
there are no negative effects from a carbon cap itself 
on the living standards of low-income households.  
Clean Energy Benefits for the Poor 
To understand how a clean-energy investment 
agenda can create ‘pathways out of poverty,’ we first 
need to establish what we mean by ‘poverty’ and for 
whom, specifically, we are seeking to create new op-
portunities. As a starting point, we begin with the 
official definition of poverty established by the U.S. 
Census Bureau, which is the basis for all funding pro-
grams in the United States tied to poverty lines. 
Since 1963, the U.S. Census Bureau has set detailed 
poverty income thresholds for families of different 
                                                 
                                                
3 The full analysis by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities on this 
issue is presented in Stone, Parrott, and Rosenbaum (2009). See 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-20-09climate.pdf. 
4  We recognize that a range of challenging technical questions 
emerges in designing the most efficient and equitable approach to 
upholding the basic principle that lower-income households be held 
harmless due to a carbon cap policy. Two excellent discussions, offer-
ing somewhat different perspectives, of the issues at stake are Boyce 
and Riddle (2008) and Parrott, Rosenbaum, and Stone (2009).  
sizes. For example, the poverty threshold in 2008 for 
a family of two (one adult and one child) was 
$14,840 and for a family of four with two children 
was $21,834. The family living at this threshold is 
expected to subsist on what the Department of Agri-
culture terms the ‘thrifty food plan,’ which is the 
amount of food needed for each family member to 
receive the basic caloric minimum. 
The government's methodology then assumes that 
poor families spend approximately one-third of their 
budget on food. Thus, to generate the dollar figures 
for the poverty threshold, the government simply 
multiples the dollar value of the ‘thrifty food plan’   
by three. 
Over many years, researchers and government offi-
cials have questioned the adequacy of this method 
for establishing poverty thresholds. The most exten-
sive scientific survey of these issues was that spon-
sored by the National Research Council (hereafter 
NRC; Citro and Michael 1995). According to the NRC 
study, establishing overall poverty thresholds on the 
basis of food costs alone presents many problems. 
For one thing, there are large variations in housing 
and medical care costs by region and population 
groups. In addition, food prices have fallen relative to 
those for housing. Child care costs have also not 
been adequately accounted for. This consideration 
has become increasingly important as rising propor-
tions of women from low-income families—due to the 
decline in support for traditional welfare programs, 
among other factors—have entered the labor force.  
The NRC study reports on six alternative methodologies 
to the current official method for measuring absolute 
poverty for a two adult/two child family.5 The thresh-
olds generated by these alternative methodologies are 
all higher than the official threshold, ranging between 
23.7 and 53.2 percent above the official threshold. The 
average value of these alternative estimates is 41.7 
percent higher than the official threshold.  
 
5 The NRC study includes consideration of “relative” as well as “abso-
lute” measures of poverty. Relative poverty, as the term suggests, 
takes account of problems resulting from pronounced inequality in a 
society, even if that society’s average living standard is relatively high. 
However, we focus here only on absolute poverty measures. For an 
insightful overview on these themes as well as current poverty trends 
throughout the world, see Keith Griffin, “Problems of Poverty and 
Marginalization” (2000). 
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An alternative approach to establishing living stan-
dard thresholds is reflected in the ‘basic family 
budgets’ developed by researchers at the Economic 
Policy Institute. This basic budget line is significantly 
higher than the official U.S. poverty line. It is a meas-
ure that, according to James Lin and Jared Bernstein 
(2008), “represents the annual family income re-
quired to maintain a safe and comfortable, but mod-
est standard of living.” Under this basic family 
budget, a family will be renting their home, with the 
rent set at the lower 40th percentile level of the mar-
ket price in their community. The family’s food ex-
penses are based on the U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s ‘low cost plan,’ which is a basic diet that 
assumes almost all food is prepared in the home. 
Similarly modest allocations are also made for health 
care, child care, and transportation. Expenditures on 
clothing, entertainment, personal care, reading ma-
terials, educational materials, and other miscellane-
ous items equal, in total, only 24 percent of the 
family’s housing and food budgets. In comparing the 
EPI ‘basic budget line’ to the official poverty line, the 
EPI line ranges between about 200 and 300 percent 
of the official poverty line.  
Considering the results of the NRC study and the EPI 
line, we think a rough, usable target group for our 
study—the low-income group for whom we consider 
whether the clean-energy investment agenda will 
create expanded economic opportunities—will be all 
households in the United States living at or below 
200 percent of the official government poverty line. 
According to that low-income standard, as of 2007, 
there were about 34 million households living be-
neath this standard, 31 percent of all households in 
the country. There were also 78 million people living 
in these households, 26 percent of the total U.S. 
population.6 Given these figures, it is clear that any 
set of policy initiatives that can substantially improve 
living conditions for so large a proportion of the U.S. 
population—or even offer this result as a serious 
possibility—deserves our serious attention. 
                                                 
6 Households include family and non-family households. Figures are 
based on authors’ analysis of the 2008 CPS ASEC data and 2007 
American Community Survey.  





CLEAN-ENERGY INVESTMENTS  
Basic Employment Conditions for Low-Income 
Households 
In Table 1, we show the basic employment situation 
for workers living in low-income households, i.e. be-
low 200 percent of the official poverty line, versus 
those living above 200 percent of the official   
poverty line. A few striking things stand out from 
these figures. 
TABLE 1. EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS AND JOB CREDENTIALS FOR 
ADULTS IN LOWER VERSUS HIGHER-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS, 2008 
(Adults includes only those between ages 25-54) 
 Households   
below 200% of 
the poverty line 
Households 
above 200% of 
the poverty line 
Median educational  






(two years of 
college) 
Households with at least one 
unemployed adult  
8.5% 4.0% 
Households with at least one 
under-employed adult  
4.6% 1.6% 
Median hourly wage for 
 employed adults 
$10.10 $19.00 
Households with any adults in 
the labor force  
71.3% 95.6% 
Households with all adults in 
the labor force  
55.1% 82.6% 
Source: U.S. Current Population Survey 2008 
To begin with, the average level of educational cre-
dentials is two full years lower for workers in low-
income households. This makes it more difficult for 
them to compete on the job market. It also empha-
sizes the point that, for the clean-energy investment 
agenda to serve well as an anti-poverty agenda, it will 
be crucial to generate not merely an abundance of 
new jobs, but, in particular, new job opportunities for 
people with relatively low educational credentials.  
As for the employment situations themselves for 
adults in low-income households, the first key result 
is that there is a much higher rate of unemployment 
for workers in low-income households—8.5 percent 
of low-income households include at least one un-
employed adult member, whereas only 4.0 percent 
of higher-income households include at least one 
unemployed adult. We see a similar result in consid-
ering adults in low-income households that are ‘un-
deremployed.’ Among ‘underemployed’ workers, we 
include those working part-time who would prefer 
working full-time. We also include ‘discouraged’ 
workers—people who consider themselves still in the 
labor force, but who have been discouraged from 
looking for a job over the past two weeks. We see in 
Table 1 that the number of low-income households 
with at least one underemployed adult is triple that 
for higher-income households—i.e. 4.6 percent with 
low-income households versus only 1.6 percent with 
higher-income households.  
In terms of wages, we see, not surprisingly, that the 
average wage earned by adults in low-income 
households, at $10.10 an hour, is about half the 
median wage for non-poor households of $19.00 an 
hour. At a wage of $10.10 per hour, a worker would 
earn roughly $20,000 for a full year of full-time work. 
This is nearly $24,000 below the amount needed to 
bring a family of four to 200 percent of the official 
poverty line.  
Lower-income households are also characterized by 
a much lower percentage of adults participating in 
the labor force—either having a job or being unem-
ployed but looking for work. As we see, with low-
income households, about 70 percent have at least 
one member in the labor force and about 55 percent 
with all adults in the labor force. By contrast, fully 96 
percent of all higher-income households have at 
least one adult in the labor force, and 83 percent 
have all adults as labor market participants. 
Why don’t lower-income adults participate at higher 
rates in the labor force, going out, at least, to look for 
a job even if they do not succeed in obtaining one? 
According to a range of research, more people do 
enter the labor force when they see that their 
chances of gaining employment are rising. For adults 
in low-income households with substantial unem-
ployment and underemployment rates, they are re-
ceiving a strong message that their chances of 
finding a job are not high. Their low rate of labor 
force participation reflects this difficult reality. Fur-
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ther research also shows that labor force participa-
tion rates rise when pay levels rise. Again, the low 
average wage of $10.10 serves to discourage low-
income adults from entering the labor force.7 
Overall then, to significantly improve job opportuni-
ties for people in low-income households, the most 
basic factors would be to: 1) raise the number of jobs 
that are readily available for lower-credentialed 
workers, and 2) improve the wages for these lower-
credentialed workers. Expanding the number of jobs 
that include opportunities for advancement through 
training provides one important path for raising 
wages. Establishing both living wage standards and 
fair opportunities for workers to join unions will also 
be crucial for improving wages.  
We now consider the extent to which a clean- 
energy investment agenda can contribute toward 
these aims. 
How a Clean-Energy Investment  
Program Creates Jobs 
Spending money in any area of the U.S. economy will 
create jobs, since people are needed to produce any 
good or service that the economy supplies. This is 
true regardless of whether the spending is done by 
private businesses, households, or a government 
entity. However, spending directed toward a clean-
                                                 
                                                
7 For example, Bartik (2002) finds evidence that when the chances of 
getting a job improve (i.e., the unemployment rate falls), not only do 
more people obtain jobs but more people who dropped out of the labor 
force begin to look for work. In particular, he finds that when the un-
employment rate declines by one-percent among single mothers, their 
labor force participation rate increases by 0.3%. This estimate meas-
ures the impact of a fall in unemployment on their labor force partici-
pation rate after five years of adjustment, taking into account the fact 
that a rise in labor force participation may subsequently raise unem-
ployment somewhat if those entering the labor force do not find jobs 
immediately. With respect to rising incomes and labor force participa-
tion, a classic study of the impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC)—the federal program that subsidizes the earnings of low-income 
workers—finds that more generous EITC benefits increases the labor 
force participation among low-income single mothers (Eissa and Lieb-
man 1996). Pollin et al. (2008, Chapter 13) also shows that when 
Santa Fe, NM established a citywide living wage of $8.50 in 2004-05, 
which represented a 65 percent raise over the then statewide mini-
mum wage of $5.15, this produced a nearly seven percentage point 
rise in the labor force participation rate among those with a high 
school degree or less. 
 
energy investment program will have a much larger 
positive impact on jobs than spending in other areas, 
including, for example, within the oil industry—
including all phases of oil production, refining, trans-
portation, and marketing—or coal industry. Again, this 
is true regardless of whether the spending—on clean 
energy or fossil fuel energy—is done by households, 
private businesses or the government. As such, a 
clean-energy investment program will be a net 
source of job creation in the United States relative to 
spending the same amount of money on fossil fuels.  
There are three sources of job creation associated 
with any expansion of spending—direct, indirect, and 
induced effects. For purposes of illustration, consider 
these categories in terms of investments in home 
retrofitting or building wind turbines: 
1. Direct effects: the jobs created, for example, by 
retrofitting homes to make them more energy effi-
cient or building wind turbines;  
2.  Indirect effects: the jobs associated with indus-
tries that supply intermediate goods for the building 
retrofits or wind turbines, such as lumber, steel, and 
transportation;  
3.  Induced effects: the expansion of employment 
that results when people who are paid in the con-
struction or steel industries spend the money they 
have earned on other products in the economy.  
Figure 1 shows the total number of jobs—direct, indi-
rect, and induced—that we estimate would be cre-
ated from spending $1 million in a combination of six 
clean-energy investment areas—three energy effi-
ciency investment areas, building retrofits, public 
transportation and freight rail, and smart grid electri-
cal transmission systems; and three renewable en-
ergy areas, solar power, wind power, and biomass 
fuels.8 As we see, this combination of clean-energy 
 
8 The allocation of total investment funds that we are working with is: 
40 percent retrofits; 20 percent mass transit/freight rail; and 10 
percent each for smart grid, wind power, solar power and biomass 
fuels. Adjusting the budgetary allocations would affect the job total 
estimates, but not by a dramatic extent. These proportions are closely 
aligned with the clean-energy investment spending priorities of the 
government ARRA program. The appendix discusses briefly how we 
derived the job figures. In sum, we worked with the U.S. input-output 
model to generate direct and indirect employment effects. We then 
assumed an induced effect as a 40 percent increment above the 
direct and indirect effects, working from our model that estimates 
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investments will generate about 16.7 jobs per $1 
million in spending. 
By contrast, we can use our same estimating model 
to generate figures for the total job creation by 
spending $1 million within the fossil fuel industries, 
i.e., oil, natural gas and coal. As Figure 1 also shows, 
the total job creation in this case is 5.3 jobs per $1 
million in spending on fossil fuels.9 In short, spend-
ing a given amount of money on a clean-energy in-
vestment agenda generates more than three times 
the number of jobs within the U.S. as does spending 
the same amount of money within the fossil fuel sec-
tors. 
FIGURE 1. JOB CREATION THROUGH $1 MILLION IN SPENDING: 
                                                                               
CLEAN-ENERGY INVESTMENTS VERSUS FOSSIL FUELS  
Source: U.S. Commerce Department input-output tables and IMPLAN 
Note: Employment estimates include direct, indirect and induced 
jobs. Details of calculations presented in the technical appendix. 
Why does the clean-energy investment program cre-
ate more jobs than spending within the fossil fuels 
industry? Three factors are at work:  
Relative labor intensity. Relative to spending within 
the fossil fuel industries, the clean-energy program 
utilizes far more of its overall investment budget on 
hiring people, and relatively less on acquiring ma-
chines, supplies, land (either on- or offshore), and 
energy itself.  
 
induced effects relative to the expansion of direct and indirect job 
creation. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Pollin, Heintz, 
and Garrett-Peltier (2009). 
9 This figure is based on the output shares represented by oil/natural 
gas and coal in the overall fossil fuel industry as of 2007. Those 
shares are 95 percent oil/natural gas and 5 percent coal. 
Domestic content. The clean-energy investment pro-
gram relies much more on products made within the 
U.S. economy and less on imports than spending 
within the fossil fuel sectors. About 97 percent of 
total spending on public transportation and building 
retrofits will remain within the U.S. economy, while, 
for the oil and gas industries, about 83 percent is 
domestic and 17 percent purchases imports. 
Pay levels. Clean-energy investments produce far 
more jobs at all pay levels—higher as well as   
lower-paying jobs than the fossil fuel industry. Clean-
energy investments also produce more jobs per   
dollar of expenditure, since the average pay for   
these jobs is less than the average for fossil-fuel   
industry jobs. Workers thus benefit through the ex-
pansion of job opportunities at all levels within the 


















To obtain a fuller sense of the range of job opportuni-
ties generated by clean-energy investments, we pre-
sent in Table 2 a listing of a representative sample of 
jobs that are likely to expand significantly through 
the clean-energy investment agenda. Given our focus 
on how the clean-energy agenda can create job op-
portunities for low-income people, it is important to 
consider the profile of jobs created according to the 
range of educational credential levels required to 
move into any given job type. As such, we have 
sorted our set of representative occupations accord-
ing to three educational credential categories—
’college degree jobs,’ requiring at least a BA degree; 
‘some college jobs,’ requiring some college but not a 
BA; and ‘high school or less jobs,’ requiring a high 
school degree or less. We also include as a final sub-
category the ‘high school or less’ jobs that offer de-
cent opportunities for advancement and higher 
wages over time. As we will discuss in some detail 
below, these are jobs primarily in construction, 
manufacturing and transportation, where, among 
other factors, opportunities for job training are more 
widely available.  
Considering this listing of occupations as a whole, 
some of the jobs associated with the clean-energy 
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as installing solar panels and researching new build-
ing material technologies. Moreover many of these 
jobs fall within the ‘college degree’ job category. But 
others will be available to people with fewer educa-
tional credentials. More generally, the majority of 
jobs will be in the same areas of employment that 
people already work in today, in every region and 
state of the country, and in all three of our educa-
tional credential categories. Constructing wind farms, 
for example, creates jobs for sheet metal workers, 
machinists and truck drivers, among many others. 
Some of these workers will have received some col-
lege education, while other occupations will require 
less formal education. Increasing the energy effi-
ciency of buildings through retrofitting requires roof-
ers, insulators and architects—again, jobs that entail 
different levels of formal educational requirements. 
Expanding mass transit systems employs civil engi-
neers, electricians, and dispatchers. In addition, all 
of these clean-energy investment strategies engage 
the normal range of service and support activities—
including accountants, lawyers, office clerks, human 
resource managers, cashiers and retail sales people. 
Here again, these are occupations that span across 
the range of formal educational requirements. 
TABLE 2. OCCUPATIONS WITH LARGE GROWTH POTENTIAL THROUGH 
CLEAN-ENERGY INVESTMENTS 
COUNTING NEW JOB OPPORTUNITIES BY EDUCATIONAL LEVELS 
College degree jobs 
Operations managers 









Some college jobs 
Construction managers 
Farmers and ranchers 
First-line supervisors of office workers 
First-line supervisors of production workers 
Engineering technicians 









Grounds maintenance workers 
Material movers 
Cashiers  











Sheet metal workers 
Bus drivers 
Industrial truck drivers  
Truck and bus dispatchers 
We differentiate jobs using categories of ‘education credentials’ 
as opposed to the more traditional skill-level categories for two 
reasons. First, we want to focus attention on the entry require-
ments of jobs in order to distinguish which jobs are more likely to 
provide employment opportunities for low-income workers. For 
many jobs, such as those in construction, education credentials 
more accurately reflect their entry requirements for employment, 
even though such jobs can require significant training to become 
fully qualified. Such training, however, is frequently obtained on-
the-job or through an employer- or employer/union-sponsored 
apprenticeship program. For this reason many of our high school 
or less’ jobs are classified by researchers Harry Holzer and 
Robert Lerman (2007) as ‘middle-skilled’ jobs: such jobs do not 
require college experience, but do require significant training. In 
addition, we believe the terms we are using more accurately 
reflects the actual distinctions between job categories. Many 
jobs are referred to as ‘low-skilled’ only because they do not 
require high education credentials or formal training even while 
such jobs frequently require operating at a high skill level to 
deliver a satisfactory product or service. Jobs in needle trades, 
child care and elderly care provide a few cases in point.  
 
Source: U.S. Current Population Survey 2008 
Note: These occupations are selected from the top 100 occupations 




GREEN PROSPERITY / PAGE 11  
 
 
Clean-Energy Investments Expand Job  
Opportunities across All Job Categories 
In Table 3, we now consider the breakdown of jobs 
created by both clean-energy investments and the 
fossil fuel industry according to our three educational 
credential categories. To begin with, we can see in 
Table 3 that the net job creation is substantially 
higher with clean-energy investments than fossil fu-
els across all three credential categories.  
Compared to investments in fossil-fuel energy, clean-
energy investments create 2.6 times more college 
degree jobs; 3.0 times more ‘some-college’ jobs; and 
3.6 times more ‘high school or less’ jobs. This is true, 
even while the proportions of jobs created in the dif-
ferent categories differ. For example, about 23 per-
cent of the total clean-energy investment jobs are 
‘college degree jobs,’ while, with fossil fuel spending, 
28 percent of the jobs generally require a college 
degree. Likewise, the proportion of ‘some-college’ 
jobs in fossil-fuels is 30.2 percent, higher than with 
clean-energy investments. The most substantial dif-
ference is with ‘high school or less’ jobs.  
Differences in Employment Opportunities across 
Low-Credentialed Sectors 
In considering employment conditions for people 
with high school degrees or less, it is important to 
recognize that there are large variations across dif-
ferent sectors of the economy in opportunities both 
to obtain jobs and to receive rising wages and better 
conditions over time.  
To begin with, we need to give special consideration 
to conditions in the construction industry. Roughly 30 
percent of all the job creation generated by the 
clean-energy investment agenda will be in the con-
struction industry, whereas construction accounts for 
only about 6 percent of total US employment. There 
are important advantages to expanding the construc-
tion sector as a major feature of the clean-energy 
investment agenda. In the short term, construction 
has been hit severely by the housing bubble col-
lapse, with nearly 1.6 million jobs having been lost 
since September 2006.10  
                                                 
10 See http://www.bls.gov/ces/#data.  
TABLE 3. BREAKDOWN OF JOB CREATION BY FORMAL EDUCATIONAL 
CREDENTIAL LEVELS 






in Job Creation  
(column 1 – 2) 
Total job creation  16.7 5.3  11.4 
College degree 
jobs 
• B.A. or above  
• $24.50 













• some college 
but not B.A. 
• $14.60  











High school or 
less jobs 
• high school 
 degree or less 
• $12.00  











High school or  
less jobs with  
decent earnings 
potential 












Source: 2008 Current Population Survey, IMPLAN 
Note: Average wage is the median wage for all workers across all 
industries within each of the credential categories listed above.  
Also, construction jobs cannot be outsourced. Retro-
fitting a home in Maryland can only be done in Mary-
land. The public transportation system in Los Angeles 
can be upgraded only in Los Angeles. On average, 
construction jobs also pay decently, in part because 
unions still have a strong presence in the industry. In 
2008, union membership among construction work-
ers employed in the private sector was 16.2 percent. 
This compares to the 8.4 percent among all private 
sector workers.11  
Recent studies suggest that construction workers 
who join unions typically earn 25 percent more than 
                                                 
11 “Union membership in 2008,” Bureau of Labor Statistics News 
Release, January 28, 2009. 
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non-union construction workers.12 This is even 
higher than the average 15 percent union wage 
premium for workers across all industries. Aside from 
the bargaining power that these workers gain 
through union representation, unions also raise the 
pay and benefits of construction workers by providing 
apprenticeship training. This type of training greatly 
improves the ability of entry-level workers to estab-
lish themselves over time in relatively well-paid and 
stable construction-industry positions. More gener-
ally, as we discuss further below the opportunities for 
entry-level workers in construction are far more fa-
vorable than, for example, those facing workers in 
the restaurant, hotel or personal service occupations 
such as cleaning services.  
                                                
On the other hand, employment in construction has 
long been dominated by white males. The industry 
has a history of hiring discrimination against women 
and racial minorities and even now, nearly 60 percent 
of all construction jobs are held by white non-Hispanic 
males. Women who try to enter construction trades 
face sexual harassment and work schedules that are 
not family-friendly. It is essential that the clean-energy 
investment agenda include strong measures to break 
down the employment barriers in these trades. An 
important first step would be for the Department of 
Labor to revive its long-dormant Federal Contract 
Compliance programs. If enforced, these measures 
would go far toward providing women and minorities 
a fair share of the construction jobs generated by the 
clean-energy investment agenda. 
Beyond the situation in construction, it is more gen-
erally the case that there are significant differences 
among low-credentialed jobs in terms of their possi-
bilities for advancement. In their 2005 book, Moving 
Up or Moving On: Who Advances in the Labor Mar-
ket? Andersson, Holzer and Lane provide a system-
atic examination of what kinds of jobs provide low-
income workers with decent earnings growth. By 
their definition, low-income workers will have made 
the initial steps toward moving beyond poorly-paid 
jobs when they are able to raise their initial earnings 
of about $16,000 per year (in 2008 dollars) to above 
$20,000 per year after about three years. According 
to their study, industries in which low-income work-
 
12 See Belman and Voos (2006). 
ers are better able to achieve decent earnings 
growth include construction first of all, but also dura-
ble goods manufacturing, employment services (i.e., 
temporary employment agencies), health services, 
public administration, social services, transportation 
and utilities, and wholesale trade. Workers employed 
in industries such as apparel and textile manufactur-
ing, hotels, personal services such as dry cleaning, 
and restaurants and bars have far less opportunity to 
improve their earnings over time.13 
In the final row of Table 3, we show data comparing 
the clean-energy investment agenda with fossil fuel 
spending in terms of the numbers of high school or 
less jobs they create that have decent longer-term 
employment opportunities. These are jobs in the in-
dustries identified by Andersson, Holzer, and Lane as 
offering relatively good opportunities for improved 
wages over time. As we see in the table, the differ-
ence between the clean-energy investment agenda 
and fossil fuels is particularly sharp in this category. 
Here we see that clean-energy investments will cre-
ate 4.8 jobs per $1 million in spending, while fossil 
fuel investments produce only 0.7 jobs in this cate-
gory. That is, clean-energy investments generate 
nearly seven times more jobs here than do fossil-fuel 
investments. This is in the job category that will cer-
tainly be crucial for generating decent new employ-
ment opportunities for low-income people through a 
clean-energy investment agenda. 
Expanding Good Job Opportunities  
through Training 
Why do some jobs available to people with relatively 
low formal educational credentials provide better 
opportunities for advancement? One key factor ap-
pears to be how much training workers need to un-
dergo before becoming fully qualified for their job. In 
their examination of how low-wage workers escape 
poverty, Andersson et al. speculate that the reason 
some firms pay more and provide better raises is 
because they invest more in training their workforce 
(2005, p. 117). 
                                                 
13 Their findings are also broadly consistent with the research of Can-
cian and Meyer (2000) who studied the rate at which women improve 
their wages in different occupations after they stopped receiving 
government welfare support.  
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Employers have an incentive to pay their workers 
decent wages if their workers require moderate to 
high levels of training. Workers not only become 
more valuable to the firm because they become 
more productive once trained, but also because re-
placing such workers can be costly for the employer. 
If a trained worker leaves the firm, the employer 
cannot reap the benefits of the time and resources 
they invested in their now former employee’s skills. 
Moreover, the firm must then hire and train a new 
worker. Decent entry-level wages and the promise of 
higher wages over time can help retain workers. In 
effect, because it is costly to replace workers with a 
meaningful amount of training, these workers can 
bargain for higher wages than workers competing for 
jobs with minimal training requirements.14 
The ‘high school or less’ jobs with decent earnings 
potential we presented in Table 3, in fact, do require 
significant levels of on-the-job training relative to jobs 
in this category offering lesser opportunities for ad-
vancement. In Table 4, we illustrate this by compar-
ing the training requirements of two sets of jobs with 
low formal educational credentials. The first set in-
cludes five representative occupations among the 
‘high school or less’ jobs with decent earnings poten-
tial. These occupations include carpenters, construc-
tion laborers, construction painters, bus drivers, and 
truck drivers. The second grouping of jobs in Table 4 
includes five representative occupations among the 
industries that Andersson et al. identified as having 
relatively poor earnings potential (hotels, restau-
rants, and personal services). These occupations 
include cooks, waiters/waitresses, cashiers, food 
preparation workers, and maids/housekeeping 
cleaners. 
We use Bureau of Labor Statistics categories of “the 
most significant source of education or training 
needed to become qualified in an occupation” to 
characterize the training requirements of these two 
sets of occupations (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2008). In the upper panel of Table 4, we can see 
that the five representative occupations require at 
least moderate-term on-the-job training. These jobs 
require skills that at minimum “can be acquired dur- 
                                                 
14 For a review of the theories and evidence of the relationship be-
tween training and earnings see Frazis and Spletzer 2005. 
TABLE 4. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AMONG ‘HIGH SCHOOL OR 
LESS’ JOBS 
Representative occupations with decent earnings potential 
Occupation  Most significant source of education or 
training 
Carpenters  Long-term on-the-job training 
Construction laborers  Moderate-term on-the-job training 
Construction painters  Moderate-term on-the-job training 
Bus drivers  Moderate-term on-the-job training 
Industrial truck drivers  Moderate-term on-the-job training 
 
Representative occupations with poor earnings potential 
Occupation  Most significant source of  
education or training 
Cooks  Short-, moderate, and long-term  
on-the-job training 
Waiters/waitresses  Short-term on-the-job training  
Cashiers  Short-term on-the-job training 
Food preparation workers  Short-term on-the-job training 
Maids/house cleaners  Short-term on-the-job training 
Source: BLS, 2008; CPS 2008 
ing 1 to 12 months of combined on-the-job experi-
ence and informal training.” For example, most con-
struction laborers acquire their skills on the job by 
assisting other more experienced workers and then 
may also get some classroom training. Some con-
struction laborer jobs require more formal training, 
such as 2 to 4 year apprenticeships, particularly 
those involved in nonresidential construction. By 
contrast, four of the five representative occupations 
with poor earnings potential require one month or 
less on-the-job training. Only cooks may require more 
than one month of training, depending on the spe-
cific type of establishment they work in, such as fast-
food or full-service restaurants.  
Overall then, significant levels of on-the-job training 
are clearly an important resource that will enable 
workers with low formal educational credentials to 
be promoted into jobs that will pay good wages. As 
such, to maximize the potential of the clean-energy 
investment agenda to create pathways out of pov-
erty, it will be crucial to expand opportunities for ap-
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propriate job training as a key complement to the 
overall growth in employment itself.  
Here it is important to note that, as of our publication 
date, the ACESA bill as reported out of committee, 
does not include measures to assist unemployed 
and underemployed workers with entry into the 
clean-energy economy. This is a major gap in the pro-
posed legislation. It stands in sharp contrast to the 
generous benefits, discussed above, that would be-
come available to workers who face layoffs in the 
fossil fuel industries. 
Living Wage Laws and Unions 
As we have seen in Table 3, of the roughly 17 jobs 
per $1 million in spending that would be generated 
through the clean-energy investment agenda, about 
five fall into the category of requiring high school de-
grees or less, while still offering decent earnings po-
tential. As we have just discussed, these are the jobs 
where training opportunities can play a crucial role in 
raising pay levels. But that still leaves about three 
jobs per $1 million in spending out of the 17 total 
that, based on current conditions, would not offer 
decent pay opportunities for people with high school 
degrees or less. As we have listed in Table 2, these 
would be for people working in agriculture, retail, and 
cleaning services, among others.  
However, these jobs as well need to be supported by 
policies to ensure that they will offer at least mini-
mally decent pay and working conditions. On its own, 
the clean-energy investment agenda will generate an 
expansion of employment opportunities in these job 
categories. But it cannot in itself improve conditions 
for such jobs. However, two complementary sets of 
policies can serve this purpose. They are: 1) Mini-
mum wage laws that require a ‘living wage’ standard 
throughout the country as the legal pay-level mini-
mum; and 2) A more favorable environment for union 
organizing among low-wage workers, that would, in 
turn, improve the bargaining power for workers hired 
into low-paying occupations. 
This is not the place to examine these issues in 
depth. However, in other recent and forthcoming 
work, we have addressed a range of the relevant is-
sues at hand, including how to establish living wage 
standards around the country; how to most effec-
tively combine minimum wage laws and government 
subsidy programs (especially the Earned Income Tax 
Credit) to solidify a minimally decent income level for 
low-income workers and their families; and how un-
ions can play a critical role in improving both wages 
and the overall quality of work conditions among low-
paying occupations (see, for example, Pollin 2007, 
Pollin et al. 2008, Wicks-Lim forthcoming 2009, and 
Wicks-Lim and Pollin forthcoming 2009). 
Employment Effects of $150 Billion Clean-Energy 
investment Program 
To consider how the clean-energy investment agenda 
can generate impacts on an economy-wide scale, we 
have to consider the investments not simply in terms 
of $1 million in spending, but at a level appropriate 
both to the size of the economy and to the problems 
at hand. We therefore propose to examine a clean-
energy investment expansion operating at about 
$150 billion in spending per year—i.e. $150 billion 
more in clean-energy investments and, correspond-
ingly, $150 billion less than is now being spent on 
fossil fuels. This $150 billion does not necessarily 
come from government spending. Indeed, we antici-
pate that the most of the new spending on clean-
energy investments will be provided by private sector 
investors, though many of these will be subsidized by 
a range of government incentive programs.15  
Why $150 billion? Our study with Center for Ameri-
can Progress examines in depth the level of annual 
new clean-energy investments that could be gener-
ated through the combination of subsidies, incen-
tives and regulations provided by the ACESA and the 
Obama stimulus program—the American Recovery 
and Reconstruction Act (ARRA). This level of invest-
ment would include both the direct public sector 
                                                 
15 This certainly is the aim of the clean-energy components of the 
Obama stimulus program, the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA) of 2009. That measure includes $100 billion in federal 
spending for environmental investments. But only about 25 percent 
of the total amount is to be spent on directly through public-sector 
programs alone. The rest supports a range of grants, tax incentives, 
and loan guarantees aiming to subsidize private investors who will 
undertake clean-energy investments. See Pollin, Heintz, and Garrett-
Peltier (2009) for an extensive discussion of this aspect of the ARRA 
program. See also Pollin (2009) for a discussion of the broader issue 
of combining public and private investments to advance the clean-
energy agenda. 
GREEN PROSPERITY / PAGE 15  
 
 
spending incorporated in the ARRA, but even more 
importantly, the private sector investments encour-
aged by both the ARRA and the ACESA. A shift toward 
clean-energy investments at this level would amount 
to about 1.1 percent of GDP and about 8 percent  
of total private investment in the economy as of 
2007, the level before the severe economic down-
turn of 2008.16 
More important for our specific purposes, as we will 
see, a $150 billion shift in spending from fossil fuels 
to clean energy within the 2008 U.S. economy   
will generate a reduction in unemployment of   
around one percent. This seems like a desirable 
benchmark, to the extent that the clean-energy in-
vestment agenda is concerned with job creation and 
poverty reduction in addition to its underlying envi-
ronmental benefits.17 
In the upper panel of Table 5, we present the overall 
figures on employment creation through $150 billion in 
investment spending in clean energy and fossil fuels. 
The basic result is that the clean-energy investment 
agenda will generate about 2.5 million jobs. If one as-
sumes the worst-case scenario to be true—that $150 
billion spent on clean energy means $150 billion not 
spent on fossil-fuel energy—then shifting $150 billion 
out of fossil fuels will, in turn, lead to about 790,000 in 
job losses.18 The net effect of the $150 billion clean-
                                                 
16 See Pollin, Heintz, and Garrett-Peltier (2009). 
17 Of course, we cannot know in advance at what point this level of 
annual investments in clean energy will be reached within the U.S. 
economy. The figure is probably higher than what is likely to occur 
within the next year or two, especially given the severe recession and 
disastrous conditions of our financial institutions. But this level of 
annual investments is certainly attainable over the next several years, 
especially if we allow that public policies such as the ACESA continue 
to support these initiatives beyond the initial spending support pro-
vided by the ARRA. See Pollin, Heintz, and Garrett-Peltier (2009) for 
further discussion on this point. 
18The job losses would occur across the variety of industries associated with the 
production and distribution of gas, oil, and coal in this worst-case scenario. 
These include activities such as oil and gas extraction, coal mining, oil refining, 
pipeline transport, coal and petroleum product manufacturing, natural gas 
distribution, and other support activities (see the technical appendix for details). 
A small number of regions of the country have a high concentration of particular 
fossil fuel-related activities, including crude oil production in Texas, oil refining 
in Louisiana, and coal mining in Appalachia and Wyoming. However, other 
fossil-fuel-related activities—including transporting fuels, converting fuels to 
electricity, and retail delivery of fuel for cars and home heating—take place in 
every region of the country. Because these activities are geographically wide-
spread, so too would be the job losses resulting from the declining reliance on 
energy investment agenda will therefore be to increase 
overall employment by about 1.7 million.  
TABLE 5. IMPACT OF $150 BILLION CLEAN-ENERGY INVESTMENTS 
ON U.S. LABOR MARKET  
A) Overall employment expansion through $150 billion shift from  
fossil fuels to clean energy  
1) Job creation through $150 billion  
spending on clean energy 
2.5 million jobs 
2) Job creation through $150 billion  
spending on fossil fuels 
788,557 jobs 
3) Net job creation through shift to clean 
energy (row 1 – 2) 
1.7 million jobs 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and IMPLAN 
B) Impact of clean-energy job expansion on 2008 U.S. labor market 
1) Overall labor force  154.3 million 
2) Total employed before 
clean-energy investments 
145.4 million 
3) Total unemployed before 
clean-energy investments 
8.9 million 
4) Unemployment rate before 
clean-energy investments 
(row 3 / row 1) 
5.8%  
(8.9 million/154.3 million) 
5) Impact on total employment 
of shift from fossil fuels to 
clean energy 
Employment rises by 1.72  
million jobs: 
1.2% increase to 147.1 million 
6) Impact on unemployment 
rate of shift from fossil fuels to 
clean energy 
(row 3 – row 5) / row 1) 
Unemployment falls from 5.8% 
to 4.7% 
(7.18 million/154.3 million) 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and IMPLAN 
In the lower panel of Table 5, we consider what the 
impact would have been on the 2008 U.S. labor mar-
ket if there had been a net increase in employment of 
1.7 million jobs. As we see, with 145.4 million em-
ployed and 8.9 million unemployed in 2008, this pro-
duced an average unemployment rate of 5.8 percent. 
A net increase of 1.7 million new jobs would therefore 
lower the unemployment rate to 4.7 percent. 
This one percentage point reduction in the country’s 
                                                                                
fossil fuels as an energy source. At the same time, we do need to emphasize 
that this is a worst-case scenario. Under a more likely scenario, the increase in 
clean-energy investments will proceed at a more rapid rate than the decline in 
spending on fossil fuels. 
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unemployment rate should generate a rise in wages, 
across the board, and in particular for low-income 
workers. This is because the fall in unemployment will 
increase workers’ bargaining power, with businesses 
willing to pay more to attract the workers they need. 
According to the body of research surveyed by Bartik 
(2001), a one percentage point fall in the unemploy-
ment rate—from, say, 6 percent to 5 percent, as could 
be accomplished by a $150 billion shift from fossil fuel 
spending to clean-energy investments—will in turn lead 
to a rise in average earnings of about two percent.19 
Bartik notes that this positive wage effect is likely to be 
somewhat stronger at the lower end of the labor mar-
ket. This is probably because, other than the falling un-
employment rate itself, those at the low end of the 
labor market are not likely to have other tools to help 
them raise their bargaining power.20 
Differential Employment Effects of $150 Billion 
Clean-Energy investments 
In Table 6, we now consider the differential employ-
ment effects of $150 billion in spending on fossil fuels 
as against a $150 billion clean-energy investment pro-
gram. As we see, overall, a shift from fossil fuels to 
clean-energy investments will yield a net increase in 
U.S. employment of 1.7 million jobs—i.e. an increase in 
2.5 million jobs through clean-energy investments and 
a corresponding decline of about 790,000 jobs in fossil 
fuels. Of the total jobs created through the clean-energy 
                                                 
19 A range of estimates exist on the impact of unemployment on earn-
ings. For example, Bartik’s 2001 survey of five studies (Bartik 1991, 
1994, 2000; Blank and Card 1993; Card 1995) provides a range of a 
1.5 to 3.5 percent increase in average real earnings when the unem-
ployment rate falls by 1 percent. Additionally, Bartik’s 2001 study 
estimates that the average household experiences a 1.9 percent 
increase in real earnings when the unemployment rate falls by one 
percent. Finally, Hines, Hoynes, and Krueger (2001) estimate that the 
average family earnings increases by 1.3 percent for one-percent fall 
in the unemployment rate. A simple average of the seven estimates 
produced by these various studies suggests that the impact of a 1 
percent decline in the unemployment rate produces approximately a 
2 percent rise in earnings. 
20 Of course, if an employment expansion leads to a disproportionate 
rise in the labor force participation rate, the subsequent dispropor-
tionate rise in the labor supply is likely to counteract positive bargain-
ing effects for low-income workers. The key factor is that, however 
much the labor force participation rate rises, the unemployment rate 
must still fall by one percentage point in order for workers to see 
wage increases resulting through this channel. 
investment agenda, we again see, as with the $1 mil-
lion program, that about 23 percent are ‘college de-
gree’ jobs, 29 percent are ‘some college’ jobs, and 48 
percent are ‘high school or less’ jobs. And again, with 
fossil fuels, while a higher proportion of the jobs cre-
ated entail higher educational credentials, the total 
number of jobs generated through fossil fuel spending 
is substantially smaller than clean-energy investments 
across all job categories.  
TABLE 6. BREAKDOWN OF JOB CREATION THROUGH $150 BILLION 
ENERGY INVESTMENTS BY EDUCATIONAL CREDENTIAL LEVELS 






in job creation  
(column 1 – 2) 
Total job creation  2,505,732  788,557   1,717,175  
College degree jobs 
• B.A. or above  












Some college jobs 
• some college but 
not B.A. 











 483,598  
High school or less 
jobs 
• high school 
 degree or less 











 870,781  
High school or less 
jobs with decent 
earnings potential 











 614,279  
Source: 2008 Current Population Survey, IMPLAN 
Note: Average wage is the median wage for all workers across all 
industries within each of the credential categories listed above.  
Of particular interest within the $150 billion clean-
energy investment program is the net expansion of 
‘high school or less’ jobs, since these are jobs that low-
income people have the best chances to obtain. The 
data in Table 6 reaffirm what we have already seen in 
terms of the job effects of $1 million in spending on 
alternative energy uses. But here, in the context of the 
$150 billion rise in clean-energy investments, we see 
that there will be an expansion of 870,000 ‘high school 
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or less’ jobs, even after allowing for job losses in the 
fossil fuel sectors. Moreover, with clean-energy invest-
ments, there is a net expansion of about 614,000 ‘high 
school or less’ jobs that also offer decent possibilities 
for rising wages over time, in many cases, as a result of 
workers receiving additional training.  
Additional Long-Term Considerations 
Is there a difference in the duration of new clean-
energy jobs, compared to fossil-fuel jobs? As we have 
seen, clean-energy investments will generate a dis-
proportionately large expansion of new jobs in the 
construction industry. It will almost always be the 
case that working on a single construction project 
will entail a shorter time commitment than being 
e m p l o y e d  a t  a  g i v e n  c o a l  m i n e  o r  o i l  w e l l .  A t  t h e  
same time, the high demand for construction work-
ers to build the clean-energy economy—not on any 
single construction project but on many projects 
throughout every community—will continue over the 
full generation needed to complete this epoch-
defining project. In addition, as we have seen, the 
demand for workers connected directly or indirectly 
to clean-energy investments will be spread through-
out economy, in every job category, not simply in 
construction. This source of demand for workers will 
also continue through the full period required to 
build a clean-energy economy.21  
There is a related long-term employment effect that 
operates to enhance long-run job creation. That is, 
when consumers are able to conserve on energy 
through investments in various energy efficiency ar-
eas, this leaves consumers with more money in their 
pockets to spend on everything else besides fossil 
fuel energy. Now consider the full array of goods and 
services that comprise an average basket of con-
sumer goods. It happens that to produce this con-
                                                 
21 For example, as described in Pollin, Heintz, and Garrett-Peltier 
(2009), to retrofit the entire U.S. building stock, including all residen-
tial and non-residential structures, would require something in the 
range of $800 billion in new investment spending. If we were to con-
sider this as a 20-year project, that would mean $40 billion per year 
in spending. This level of spending on retrofits would, in turn, gener-
ate about 670,000 jobs per year on its own. Moreover, these jobs 
would be distributed fairly evenly throughout all communities in the 
country, since, of course, all communities have buildings that would 
benefit significantly through energy retrofits.  
sumer basket requires activities—like clean-energy 
investments themselves—that entail higher labor 
intensity and domestic content as well as somewhat 
lower wages than we see with fossil fuels. As such, 
this factor will tend to strengthen the positive long-
term job effects of shifting out of fossil fuels.22 
Impact of Clean-Energy Investment Agenda on 
Representative Workers  
To provide a more concrete perspective of what it 
would mean for low-income households to have an 
adult in the household go from unemployment to 
having a job, we consider two representative cases 
drawn from the actual situations we observe with the 
U.S. government’s household and labor market data.  
For the first case, we consider the situation for a typi-
cal unemployed male construction laborer in his thir-
ties, living alone. About 27 percent of the 33.4 
million low-income households are single-person 
households, with men comprising about 54 percent 
of these households and women 46 percent. In the 
second case, we consider a four-person household, 
with two adults and two children. This kind of house-
hold accounts for about nine percent of all low-
income households. In this household, we begin with 
one adult member working. We assume that this 
person is also a man employed as a construction 
laborer. Initially, the woman in the family is engaged 
in child-rearing and managing the household, but 
does not have a paying job. But due to an expansion 
of employment opportunities tied to the clean-energy 
investment agenda, the woman takes a job as a bus 
driver. In Tables 7 and 8, we consider the impact on 
each household situation through one adult in the 
household becoming newly employed.  
Case 1:  
Unemployed construction laborer lands a job 
In this first case, an unemployed construction worker 
with a high school degree or less, is initially living on 
a range of small income sources. Typically, these will 
include support from family and friends, savings, and 
                                                 
22 This source of net job creation through increasing energy efficiency 
has been explored in depth by Skip Laitner of the American Council 
for an Energy Efficient Economy. See, for example, Laitner and 
McKinney (2008). 
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government support such as food stamps. According 
to government statistical surveys, men in this situa-
tion would typically live on about $8,870 per year. 
This level of income places them well into the range 
of the severely poor, even according to the official 
government poverty thresholds. 
TABLE 7. CASE 1: CONSTRUCTION WORKER IS UNEMPLOYED, THEN 
EMPLOYED, THEN PROMOTED 
Situation for worker living alone 




Income gain from 




to carpenter  
1. Average 
hourly wage 
$0 $12.50 $16.00 
2. Annual 
hours worked 
0  2080 (40 hours/ 






($12.50 x 2080 
hours)  
$33,280 
($16.00 x 2080 
hours) 






6. Federal  
income tax 
$0 -$2,153  -$3,428 






8. Earned  
income tax 
credit 
$0 $0  $0 
9. Child tax 
credits 
$0 $0  $0 
10. Food 
stamps 
$870 $0  $0 
Disposable 
Income  
(sum of rows 
5 - 10) 
$8,870 $21,858 
(+$12,988; 





Source: 2008 Current Population Survey 
Notes: The new job is a representative construction-laborer job with 
the average wages and hours of a worker with a high school degree 
or less. The $8,000 in reported income among jobless single indi-
viduals could be coming from social security, supplemental security 
income, interest income, financial assistance from people outside the 
household, and financial aid for education.  
We then allow that this person becomes employed 
full-time as a construction laborer, earning the aver-
age wage of $12.50 an hour for this job among 
those with a high school degree or less. As a result of 
obtaining this job, the construction worker’s earnings 
rise to $26,000 per year. We also assume that this 
w o r k e r  i s  n o  l o n g e r  a b l e  t o  d r a w  o n  h i s  p e r s o n a l  
sources of support providing him with the $8,000 he 
was living on while he was unemployed. Because he 
now is earning income, he also has to now pay both 
income and social security taxes. He also loses his 
food stamp eligibility. But as a single man living with 
no children, he is not eligible for either Earned In-
come Tax Credit (EITC) support or, of course any form 
of child tax credits.  
Netting out all of these various factors, the effect for 
the construction worker of moving from unemploy-
ment to having a job means that his disposable in-
come rises from $8,870 to $21,858. This is an 
income increase of about $13,000.  
One of the advantages of working as a construction 
laborer is that it can lead to other better-paid occu-
pations in the construction industry. For example, by 
assisting other craft workers, such as carpenters, 
this construction laborer can gain on-the-job training 
to become a carpenter himself over time. Alterna-
tively, the work experience he gains as a construc-
tion laborer can help get him into a carpenter 
apprenticeship program. After completing a 3-4 year 
apprenticeship program he can become a carpenter 
through this route as well. In the last column of Table 
7 we illustrate how the living standard of this worker 
would change if he moved from his entry-level job as 
a construction laborer to a position as a carpenter.  
Thus, in the last column of Table 7, we allow the con-
struction laborer to advance to a job as a carpenter 
earning the average carpenter wage of $16.00 an 
hour. This higher wage increases the worker’s earn-
ings from $26,000 to $33,280, an increase of about 
$7,000. This worker is now earning at a level that 
well exceeds our poverty standard of twice the official 
poverty line, or $20,652 for a single person under 65 
years old.23 Netting out the rise in his tax obligations, 
the higher wage rate of $16.00 now represents an 
                                                 
23 Both the federal poverty income threshold and EPI’s basic budget 
income thresholds (discussed earlier) are pre-tax measures. That is, 
these income thresholds account taxes as among a family’s living 
expenses. 
GREEN PROSPERITY / PAGE 19  
 
 
increase in disposable income to about $27,000. 
This level of disposable income represents an im-
provement of $18,000 per year relative to his situa-
tion when he was unemployed. In this case, the clean 
energy investment agenda has provided a clear 
pathway out of poverty for this worker. 
Case 2: Mom becomes a bus driver 
In this case, we assume that the father in this house-
hold, like in the previous case, holds a job as a con-
struction laborer. But the mother, who had been 
focused on childcare and running the household, 
now accepts a position as a bus driver. This position 
opens up as a result of the large expansion in public 
transportation spending associated with clean-
energy investments. This woman’s wages will be 
$13.70 per hour, which is the average wage for bus 
drivers with a high school degree or less. She will be 
employed for a full 52 weeks, but at 30 hours per 
week, as opposed to a full-time position. This is 
about the average number of hours that bus drivers 
are now employed throughout the U.S. 
We see in Table 8 the impact on the family’s living 
standard of the mother becoming a bus driver. When 
only the father working in paid labor, the family was 
eligible for both the earned income tax credit of 
$3,290 and child credits of $2,000. But these gov-
ernment subsidies are counterbalanced by both fed-
eral income and social security tax obligations.  
Overall, when the father brought home the family’s 
only paycheck, the family’s earnings were $26,000. 
This places them at about $17,700 below our poverty 
standard of 200 percent of the official poverty line of 
$43,668 for this sized family. When the mother takes 
a job as a bus driver, this means that the family’s to-
tal earnings rise to $47,372. Their income and social 
security taxes now rise with this additional income 
source. The family also now loses its EITC eligibility. 
With both parents working, the family’s annual dis-
posable income now rises to more than $43,000. 
This is a 48 percent increase over their situation 
when only the father was employed in construction.  
At the same time, because the mother is now in the 
workforce, she now has much less time available for 
child care. We therefore have to allow that the fam-
ily’s child care expenses will rise considerably. Based 
on research underlying the EPI’s basic budget stan-
dard, we allow that child care costs will amount to 
about 20 percent of the household’s earnings when 
TABLE 8. CASE 2. MOTHER/HOMEMAKER BECOMES A BUS DRIVER 
Change in family income when second adult in 4-person household 
becomes employed 
 Family  income 




with both adults 
working: mother 
hired as bus driver  
Father: 
1. Hourly wage as  
construction worker 
$12.50 $12.50 
2. Total hours of work  
 
Full-time: 
2080 hours (40 




3. Annual earnings  $26,000 




4. Hourly wage as bus 
driver 
— $13.70 
5. Total hours of work  0  ¾ time: 
1,560 hours (30 
hours/week x 52 
weeks) 
6. Annual earnings  0  $21,372 
Household: 
7. Total household  
income (rows 3 + 6) 
$26,000 $47,372 
(+82.2%) 
8. Federal income tax  -$111  -$2,569 
9. Social security tax  -$1,989  -$3,624 
10. Earned income tax 
credit 
$3,290 $0 
11. Child tax credits  $2,000  $2,000 
12. Food stamps  $0  $0 
13. Disposable income 
without child care costs 
(sum of rows 7 – 12) 
$29,190 $43,179 
(+47.9%) 
14. Child care costs  —  -$9,500 
Disposable income with 
child care costs 
(row 13 + row 14) 
$29,190 $33,679 
(+15.4%) 
Source: 2008 Current Population Survey 
Notes: This household has two adults and two children. The new 
employment is from a representative bus driver job with the average 
wages and hours of a worker with a high school degree or less.  




both parents are at jobs close to full-time. This 
means that child care expenses rise to about $9,500 
per year. Even so, net of the increase in the family’s 
child care costs, the family’s disposable income is 
now about $34,000. Thus, even if we subtract the 
new child care costs from the family’s disposable 
income, the family still has about $4,000 more in 
their budget. This is a 15 percent rise over their 
situation when only the father was employed. 
Thus, with this household as well, the new job oppor-
tunities generated by the clean energy investment 
agenda has created a pathway out of poverty for this 
f a m i l y  a s  w e l l .  T h e y  m o v e  f r o m  e a r n i n g  a b o u t  
$17,700 below the 200 percent of poverty line stan-
dard to $3,700 over the 200 percent line. Even after 
allowing for their increased tax obligations and   
child care costs, the new job opportunities gener-
ated by the clean energy investment agenda will   
lead to a substantial improvement in the family’s 
living standard. 
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HOME RETROFITS FOR  
LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
Since 1977, the U.S. Department of Energy has 
maintained a Weatherization Assistance Program 
(WAP) for low-income families that provides support 
for homeowners’ residential retrofits. Since its incep-
tion, 6.2 million households have received support 
through this program. This amounts to about 
200,000 low-income households a year getting as-
sistance to retrofit their homes. In more recent years, 
the number of households served per year has 
dipped significantly below this average rate, to 
roughly 100,000 households per year.24  
The program is being expanded substantially through 
the ARRA, with $5 billion being allocated over two 
years to support retrofits for households whose in-
come is up to 200 percent of the official poverty   
line, i.e. to the level we are using within this study as 
our target group. Under this program, low-income 
households could receive up to $6,500 to finance 
their home retrofit. The ARRA also is providing an 
additional $3.1 billion through the State Energy   
Program and $3.2 billion through the Energy Effi-
ciency and Conservation Block Grant Program, which 
are other potential sources of funding, both for retro-
fitting buildings and to support consumers making 
additional energy-saving improvements in their 
homes. Beyond the ARRA, additional measures, such 
as the ACESA now before Congress, aim to create 
further incentives to promote energy efficiency in 
residential structures. In the ACESA, the primary pol-
icy tools to promote energy efficiency are: (1)  a   
national building code; (2) funding to states for build-
ing efficiency retrofit and low-income energy effi-
ciency programs; (3) a national energy efficient 
appliances program.25 
Overall, these government initiatives recognize a 
crucial point about residential building retrofits—that 
they offer a major opportunity to deliver environ-
mental benefits as well as a higher living standard 
for low-income households. We can see this both for 
                                                 
                                                
24 See apps1.eere.energy.gov/weatherization/prog_goals.cfm?print for 
details on the rate of service of the Weatherization Assistance Program. 
25 See http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/weatherization for details on the 
Weatherization Assistance Program.   
low-income households composed of homeowners 
as well as those who are renters. In all cases, the key 
will be to develop adequate incentives and institu-
tional support networks to effectively deliver the 
large benefits that are available. 
To begin with, let us consider the possibilities avail-
able to homeowners through retrofitting an average 
privately-owned home in the United States. We de-
velop this average case based on figures provided by 
the U. S. Department of E nergy, as wel l as t hroug h 
the work of Prof. Paul Fisette, a leading authority   
in the field. Fisette has found that for an average 
home in the United States, an investment of about 
$2,500 in a home retrofit could produce an energy 
saving of about 30 percent per year. The $2,500 
expenditure would cover an energy audit, sealing   
air leaks with caulking, insulating attics and base-
ment ceilings, and purchasing energy-efficient light 
bulbs.26 
As of 2007, the average household income was 
around $60,000, and the average household spends 
about five percent of its income on household energy 
consumption. This means that the five percent of 
total income going to household energy consumption 
amounts to $3,000 per year. This means that 
through a $2,500 investment for a retrofit—about 80 
percent of the household’s annual energy budget—
the average household would save about $900 per 
year in reduced energy costs. The $900 in savings 
that this average household would enjoy each year 
through the energy retrofit means that the $2,500 
investment in home retrofitting will fully pay for itself 
within three years. These figures are brought to-
gether in Table 9 below. 
 
 
26  See http://www.umass.edu/bmatwt/faculty/PFisetteCV_2006.pdf 
for Prof. Fisette’s publications on this issue. We are grateful to Prof. 
Fisette for extensive personal discussion in addition to what we found 
in his publications. In terms of the costs of retrofitting an average 
home, Fisette explains that average household could raise energy 
efficiency still more by spending another $2,500—for a total of 
$5,000—on insulating or replacing windows, purchasing energy-
efficient appliances, and purchasing a thermostat reset, which can 
control the amount of energy needed to maintain hot water in the 
home’s boiler. A still more expensive retrofit, in the range of $8,000 
would include putting more insulation into walls, putting new siding 
on walls, and purchasing a more energy efficient furnace or boiler. 
GREEN PROSPERITY / PAGE 22  
 
 
TABLE 9. ANNUAL SAVINGS FROM INVESTMENT IN HOME RETROFIT 
Example is for average household, $2,500 retrofit 
Annual household income  $60,000 
Annual household energy expenditures 
(5% of total income) 
$3,000 
Potential annual savings from $2,500 retrofit 
(30% of current expenditure level) 
$900 
 
The proportional costs and savings attainable 
through these relatively modest investments in retro-
fits could be achievable as well with both smaller 
homes owned by low-income households as well as 
with multi-unit residential buildings for renters. That 
is, a savings in energy costs of around 30 percent 
per year would be attainable through an initial in-
vestment which is roughly equal to about 80 percent 
of one year’s annual energy bill.  
In Table 10, we show the living circumstances for the 
33.4 million household that live below 200 percent 
of the poverty line. As we see, these households are 
roughly evenly divided between homeowners (16.5 
million households) and renters (16.9 million house-
holds). We have broken down renters further be-
tween those living, respectively, in unsubsidized 
(12.5 million households) and subsidized (4.4 million 
households) apartments. These differences will be 
significant for establishing the appropriate arrange-
ments to enable the residents of these various dwell-
ing types to all benefit from the energy savings 
resulting from retrofits. 
The most straightforward situation is with the 16.5 
million low-income households that are homeowners. 
This household type could save about $630 per year 
through a low-cost retrofit, costing about $1,800. As 
we see in the table, savings at this level would repre-
sent a nearly four percent reduction in living costs 
relative to the households’ income. In other words, 
after the retrofit has been paid off, this investment 
alone would raise the living standard of these 
households by about four percent. By lowering their 
demand for energy within the home, low-income 
households would also reduce their vulnerability to 
the severe swings in energy prices that we have ex-
perienced in recent years. These sharp price fluctua-
tions have produced insecurity among low-income 
households as to their ability to cover their monthly 
energy bills, especially in the winter. The benefits for 
low-income households of raising their level of home 
energy efficiency are, of course, in addition to the 
environmental benefits of reducing energy consump-
tion and greenhouse gas emissions.  
TABLE 10. ENERGY COST SAVINGS FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 















































































































































































































million $16,564  $2,108 
 








million $10,476  $1,648 
 
$1,400  $500 4.7% 
Sources: Median income comes from ASEC 2008; U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (2008); U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (2008). 
Yet we do still need to consider how the initial up-
front investment of $1,800 will be financed. The 
easiest answer is that the funds could come through 
the $5 billion in Weatherization Assistance provided 
by the ARRA. However, at most, these funds could 
cover around 2.8 million owner-occupied homes   
with $1,800 in support, i.e. about one-sixth of all   
low-income households. This would represent a   
major level of support for energy efficient homes   
in the U.S., but would still leave close to 14 million 
low-income households in need of financing through 
other means. 
Self-Financing?  
 As a more general case, it is clear from our numeri-
cal examples that, if low-income households could 
cover the initial $1,800 up-front investment in the 
retrofit, they would start seeing energy cost savings 
immediately, and their full investment would be cov-
ered in three years. In subsequent years, the energy 
savings would go directly into their pocketbooks. In 
principle therefore, individual homeowners could 
certainly choose to take on the retrofit project on 
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their own, without a government subsidy, and still 
come out ahead within about three years.  
T h e  d r a w b a c k  o f  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  i s  t h a t  i t  r e l i e s  o n  
millions of homeowners to take the initiative to get 
the financing and manage the retrofit project. This 
could create excessive levels of small-scale adminis-
trative efforts, which would slow down the forward 
progress of any large-scale clean-energy investment 
initiative. This is a problem especially to the extent 
that one would want the program to be implemented 
fairly quickly. It also places heavy demands on low-
income households to come up with the initial in-
vestment funds, take on financial risks and find extra 
time to manage such a project.  
As a way to make such projects broadly feasible for 
low-income homeowners beyond the subsidies avail-
able from the Weatherization Assistance Program, it 
will be necessary to introduce intermediaries of 
some sort to serve as administrators and risk-
bearers. These intermediaries could be paid for their 
services through the utility bills of building owners, or 
some other pre-established mode of payment. In-
deed, a local utility company, or home heating oil 
supplier could themselves possibly serve as the in-
termediaries administering the program. Non-profit 
community organizations or stand-alone businesses 
could equally serve this role.27 
The logistics of such an arrangement could be quite 
straightforward. Let’s first consider a case within the 
context of the Weatherization Assistance Program. 
To begin with, in exchange for handling all the bu-
reaucratic matters associated with receiving support 
from the Weatherization Assistance Program as well 
as arranging all the logistics of the home retrofit, the 
intermediary would receive, for example, the $630 in 
energy savings from the first year subsequent to the 
retrofit. These funds would come directly from the 
homeowners’ heating or utility bills. The homeowners 
would then see the benefits of reduced energy bills 
one year later than they would have had they them-
selves arranged for the retrofit. Meanwhile, the in-
termediary would have a substantial incentive to 
provide these cost savings as quickly as possible for 
all low-income homeowners.  
                                                 
27 These issues are also explored well in Rogers (2007). 
What about the majority of cases, when there is not 
likely to be support available through the Weatheri-
zation Assistance Program? Of course, it would be 
preferable to be able to extend the WAP to most, if 
not all, low-income homeowners. Short of that, we 
should at least allow low-income homeowners who 
invest in retrofits to receive bank loans for the pro-
ject at a subsidized rate.  
Table 11 illustrates a simple financing scheme for 
retrofitting an average home for low-income house-
holds. Under this plan, the full amount of the $1,800 
funding for the project is borrowed. The full loan pe-
riod is five years, with a simple interest rate at the 
below-market subsidized rate of three percent.  
TABLE 11. FINANCING ARRANGEMENT FOR LOW-INCOME 
HOMEOWNER RETROFIT  
Funds needed for retrofit  $1,800 
Loan principal  $1,800 
Subsidized interest rate 
on loans 
3 percent subsidized simple interest 
Repayment schedule  1st year savings split between  
homeowner and intermediary;  
4 subsequent years, principal and  
interest 
Total annual debt  
servicing for four years 
$500/year 













$630  0  $630 (split between 
homeowner and  
intermediary) 
Year 2  $630  $500  $130 
Year 3  $630  $500  $130 
Year 4  $630  $500  $130 
Year 5  $630  $500  $130 
All subsequent 
years 
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In the first year of the loan, we assume the $630 in 
savings is shared between the homeowner and the 
intermediary who arranged for the financing and con-
tracting out the project. The homeowner would then 
make annual payments of $500 in four subsequent 
years—$450 of principal and $50 in interest.28 Dur-
ing these four years, the homeowner would still see 
their energy bill reduced by $130 per year. They 
would also make no out-of-pocket payments to their 
lenders. The payments to lenders could rather come 
directly from the homeowner’s utility bill. As we see 
in the lower panel of Table 12, there is no period 
over the life of the loan where the annual repayment 
is greater than the annual energy savings of $630. 
And of course, after the loan is repaid, the home-
owners will then receive the full net energy savings of 
$630 every year thereafter.29 
Getting Benefits to Renters 
This arrangement could not operate quite as straight-
forwardly in delivering benefits of retrofits to the 
16.9 million low-income households that are renters. 
But as a general principle, if the government is pro-
viding weatherization assistance for rental units as 
well as owner-occupied dwellings, the condition un-
der which landlords could receive government assis-
tance could be that their tenants would have to 
receive some significant share of the reduction in 
energy costs. This could be handled in a straightfor-
ward way in cases where the renters themselves 
cover their own utility bills. In this case, the renters 
would see the utility bills reduced as a proportion   
of the overall energy savings achieved through   
the retrofit. We would also allow the landlords to re-
ceive a share of their energy savings. For example, if 
we assume that the total energy savings is $500   
                                                 
28 At a three percent interest rate, the actual interest annual interest 
payment would be $54, rather than $50. We have rounded to $50 to 
keep the illustration as simple as possible. 
29 In the case of a homeowner who wishes to sell their home before 
having fully repaid their loan, the sale price of the house should, in 
principle, be higher, to reflect that the house operates at a higher 
level of energy efficiency. However, the U.S. housing market is not 
likely to incorporate the benefits from retrofit investments in home 
prices, if for no other reason than this would be unfamiliar territory for 
them. It will therefore be important for government initiatives to 
spread information as widely as possible as to the cost savings that 
homeowners will receive after a house has been retrofitted. 
per year for each rental unit, we could allow that   
the tenant receives $450 in a reduced utility bill and 
the landlord receives the remaining $50 per unit. In 
this case, the tenant would still see their annual en-
ergy costs reduced by about four percent of their   
annual income. Again, this means that effectively 
their living standard would rise by four percent from 
this measure alone.  
It will be more difficult to implement such measures 
when landlords rather than tenants are responsible 
for paying utility bills. However, the landlords them-
selves would see their energy costs fall through the 
retrofit. In a competitive housing market, this fall in 
landlords’ costs should in turn lead to at least a par-
tial pass-through in terms of lower rents for tenants, 
since landlords that do lower their rents will be more 
likely to attract new tenants. 
In the case of subsidized housing units, rents are 
established based on formulas tied to renters’ ability 
to pay. Here, we could simply incorporate the energy 
savings into the formula, and reduce rent levels 
commensurately, after allowing for the administra-
tion costs of arranging for the retrofits. We saw in 
Table 11 that the average low-cost retrofit could 
generate energy savings of about 4.7 percent of the 
annual income for low-income families living in sub-
sidized housing. It is therefore reasonable to expect 
that the retrofit could yield an improvement in these 
families’ living standard in the range of four percent, 
with the remaining cost savings being used to sup-
port the general administrative costs of the subsi-
dized housing program. 
Overall, through advancing a series of institutional 
innovations in the market for building retrofits in 
combination with the existing and continued levels of 
government support, it is reasonable to expect that a 
large-scale residential retrofit program could reduce 
living costs, and corresponding raise living stan-
dards, for low-income households by about 3 – 4 
percent. And of course, these benefits would be in 
addition to the environmental gains achieved 
through operating our residential housing stock 
much more efficiently than is done at present. 




Increasing use of public transportation, as against 
private auto transportation, is an important element 
in building a clean-energy economy. At present, burn-
ing fossil fuels for transportation purposes accounts 
for about 34 percent of total carbon emissions emit-
ted within the United States, and private transporta-
tion accounts for about 61 percent of all 
transportation emissions.30 To transport people via 
public transportation as opposed to private cars pro-
duces a net reduction in carbon emissions of about 
45 percent per passenger mile. Thus, if we allowed 
that the share of public transportation travel could 
rise to about 25 percent as a share of total transpor-
tation, this, in turn, would alone generate a two per-
cent reduction in total greenhouse gas emissions.31  
Investing in public transportation is also a major 
source of job creation, relative to spending on fossil 
fuels. Spending $1 million on public transportation 
will generate about 21 jobs, while, as we have seen, 
spending the same $1 million on oil and coal will 
generate about 5.3 jobs—i.e. spending a given 
amount of money on mass transit generates about 
4.4 more jobs than spending on fossil fuels.32 
Finally, traveling by public transportation is much 
cheaper than traveling by private car. On average, it 
costs about 22 cents to travel one mile by public 
transportation, while a private car costs about 54 
cents per mile.33 That is, on average, public trans-
                                                 
r. 
                                                                               
30 American Public Transportation Authority, www.apta.com/research/ 
info/online/documents/climate_change.pdf. 
31 Figures in this paragraph come from the Energy Information Ad-
ministration, www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/carbon.html; and the 
American Public Transportation Authority, www.apta.com/research/ 
info/online/documents/climate_change.pdf. See technical appendix 
for a description of how we estimated the reduction in emissions due 
to increasing public transit use to 25 percent of total transportation. 
Achieving a rate of public transit use this high or higher has been 
achieved in dense urban areas such as the city of Chicago. In other 
areas, such rates would likely be achieved only among households 
close to urban centers. Given that 80 percent of the U.S. population 
lives in urban areas (see U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Popu-
lation and Housing, Population and Housing Unit Counts PHC-3) an 
estimate of 25 percent of public transit use seems like a reasonable 
high end goal. 
32 Pollin, Heintz, and Garrett-Peltier (2009).  
33 Cost of public transportation is from 2008 Public Transportation 
Fact Book, published by the American Public Transportation Associa-
portation is about 59 percent cheaper than traveling 
by private ca
The Obama administration’s ARRA program clearly 
recognized the importance of expanding the access 
to public transportation, allocating $18 billion over 
two years to a range of transportation projects. This 
represents 18 percent of the clean-energy and envi-
ronmental budget within the ARRA. Some of the spe-
cific initiatives being supported by the ARRA include 
purchases of electric buses, light rails, and high-
speed trains, to both expand public transportation   
offerings and raise their energy efficiency. Given   
our specific concern with job creation, it is important 
to also note that the $18 billion expenditure—$9 bil-
lion per year—will generate about 190,000 jobs per 
ye ar  w i t hi n  t he  U . S .  e co n o m y.  I f  t he  s am e  l e v e l  o f 
funding were instead allocated to expand activity in 
the fossil fuel industry, the total job creation would 
instead be about 50,000 jobs per year. Thus, moving 
the funds into public transportation as opposed to 
fossil fuels generates a net employment gain of 
about 140,000 jobs. 
Despite these major advantages of public over pri-
vate transportation, public transportation accounts 
for an extremely low share of total travel in the 
United States. We can see this from the figures   
presented in the upper panel of Table 12. As the   
table shows, as of 2007, the average U.S. household 
spent about 94 percent of its total transportation 
budget on private automobiles, and only six per- 
cent on public transportation. The share of public 
transportation spending by lower-income households 
is even lower, with the lowest 20 percent income 
group spending only 5 percent, and the 21-40   
percent income group spending a still lower 4 per-
cent of their respective transportation budgets on 
public transportation.  
 
 
tion (June 2008), Table 2: National Totals, Fiscal Year 2006, and ad-
justed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index to re-
flect public transportation price increases between 2006 and 2007. 
Cost of private car transportation is from the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics, National Transportation Statistics, Table 3-14: Average Cost 
of Owning and Operating an Automobile. The latest figure is for 2007 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/ht
ml/table_03_14.html. 
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TABLE 12. HOUSEHOLD SPENDING ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
TRANSPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007 
A) Public and private transport as share of total transport 







































































































































































































































$5,717 $5,475  96%  $242  4% 
 





spending as share 
of total household 
spending  
Public transport 
as share of total 
household 
spending 





Lowest 20%  
income group 
$20,471 15.0%  0.8% 
21-40%  
income group 
$31,150 17.6%  0.8% 
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2007, “Table 1. Quintiles of 
income before taxes: Average annual expenditures and characteris-
tics,”  www.bls.gov/cex/2007/Standard/quintile.pdf 
The broader importance of these figures becomes 
clear from the lower panel of Table 12, where we 
show transportation costs as a share of total family 
spending. As we see, transportation constitutes a 
very large share of a household’s total budget—
nearly 18 percent of the budget for an average 
household, and between 15 and 18 percent for 
lower-income households. As such, any initiative that 
could succeed in shifting households toward using 
public transportation would generate major benefits 
both in terms of the environment and job creation. It 
would also be a way to significantly reduce the costs 
of living for low-income households.34 
                                                 
                                                                               
34 Why do higher-income households spend a higher share of total 
There has been a notable rise in public transporta-
tion ridership over the past two years, with, for ex-
ample, overall ridership rising by about four percent 
in 2008 relative to 2007.35 This increase in public 
transportation use was initially sparked by the sharp 
rise in oil prices. But even as oil prices fell beginning 
in the fall of 2008, public transportation use contin-
ued to rise. The main factor here is almost certainly 
that households are attempting to reduce costs dur-
ing the recession. Thus, automobile travel fell by 3.6 
percent in 2008. It remains an open question 
whether this shift in favor of public transportation will 
be sustainable over time, depending primarily on 
whether the quality of service can improve. 
Beyond this experience of the past two years, the 
broader question is why haven’t U.S. residents, es-
pecially those at low income levels, relied more on 
public transportation over time? The answers pro-
vided in surveys are not surprising. According to a 
2001 study by Giuliano, Hu and Lee, the main factor 
is that public transportation is much less convenient 
than driving—i.e. access is bad, off-peak hours ser-
vice is limited, and transferring is difficult. This 
makes public transportation particularly difficult for 
low-income people, who, as part of their regular rou-
tine, often need to commute between multiple jobs, 
as well as transport children to child care and school. 
Of those that do use public transportation, a signifi-
cant share say that it is also expensive.  
Survey evidence also makes clear that if the public 
transportation component of the clean-energy in-
vestment agenda could address these issues of in-
convenience and costs with reasonable success, the 
payoff  could  be  substantial  for  low-income house-
holds. For example, if the public transportation com-
ponent of the clean-energy investment agenda could 
enable the average lower-income household to in-
 
household spending on public transportation? This is primarily because 
higher-income households tend to travel longer distances (e.g., from a 
suburb to the downtown of a nearby city) whereas lower-income house-
holds tend to travel short distances within central cities. Also, commuter 
rail service attracts higher-income riders even though they own cars 
because this service can provide a more dependable, less stressful, 
and faster way to travel than driving (Pucher & Renne, 2003). 
35 Data are from American Public Transportation Association March 9, 
2009 quarterly report, www.apta.com/media/releases/documents/ 
090309_ridership.pdf. 
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crease their use of public transportation to 25 per-
cent of their miles traveled, that alone would save the 
household $260 to $500 per year, raising their living 
standard through this one measure alone by 1 to 2 
percent. Of course, a more ambitious target would 
deliver proportionally greater benefits. For example, 
raising the low-income household’s use of public 
transportation to 50 percent of its total miles traveled 
would save low-income families nearly $800 per year, 
raising their living standard by nearly four percent.  
How Public Transportation Raises Living Standards  
This rise in living standards for lower-income house-
holds, in the range of one to four percent, actually 
averages two distinct situations: large cost savings 
that occur when households replace one of their ve-
hicles with public transit, and limited cost savings 
when households use public transportation but do 
not reduce the number of cars they own.  
Consider the situation that applies to the roughly 75 
percent of low-income households that own at least 
one vehicle. An improved public transit system could 
allow some of these households to reduce the num-
ber of cars that they own.36 Households that replace 
a car with public transit would see their annual 
transportation expenses fall by roughly $2,000, 
about 10 percent of their total household expendi-
tures.37 This dramatic reduction in the household’s 
transportation expenses occurs because fully 70 
percent of the cost of owning a car are ‘fixed’—they 
result because you own a car, regardless of how 
much you drive the car. These fixed costs include the 
sales price itself, including financing, insurance, reg-
istration fees, and taxes. Only 30 percent of costs 
depend on how much one drives—i.e. variable costs, 
including fuel and maintenance. Moreover, the costs 
per mile on public transit are roughly equal to the 
variable costs per mile of driving. As such, just re-
                                                 
36 In fact, in large cities known for their effective public transit sys-
tems such as New York, Washington D.C., Boston, San Francisco, and 
Chicago, the percentage of residents who own no cars is much higher 
than the national average and roughly equal to the percent of resi-
dents that rely on public transportation for commuting (2005-2007 
American Community Survey, U.S. Census Bureau). This pattern sug-
gests that when public transportation is accessible and convenient, 
significant numbers of households choose to own fewer vehicles. 
37 See technical appendix for details on the cost savings calculations. 
placing the number of miles travelled by car with 
public transit, while still owning the same number of 
cars, does not yield any cost savings.  
What about the 25 percent of low-income house-
holds that owns no vehicles? For these households, 
an improved public transit system will deliver sav-
ings, but these will be lower than for the households 
that could reduce their level of car ownership. These 
savings for households who own no cars come from 
reducing their use of other more expensive modes of 
transportation, such as taxis, that they rely on when 
they do not either own a car or have convenient pub-
lic transit service. Other available modes of transpor-
tation such as walking or biking, while less expensive 
than public transit, can only be used to access areas 
within a limited distance. By contrast, as we discuss 
further below, better public transit can improve the 
living standards of low-income people by increasing 
their mobility, including their access to jobs.  
Finally, there are broader benefits for all households 
in a low-income neighborhood in which public transit 
service is improved. Public transit access is generally 
viewed as a neighborhood amenity, and conse-
quently, tends to raise the property values of nearby 
residences. In addition, public transit stations tend to 
attract retail activity to the neighborhoods in which 
they are located.38 These higher levels of retail activ-
ity can further reduce the transportation expenses of 
households in that neighborhood, since more retail 
stores can be reached by walking or biking. 
Overall, dramatic improvements in public transit can 
raise the living standards among some low-income 
families as much as 10 percent when they reduce 
the number of cars they own. Such costs savings will 
most likely be possible for households near the ur-
ban centers in their area.  
Targeting Investments in Public Transit 
Such a shift in transportation patterns for lower-
income households would require major investments 
in our public transportation infrastructure. The ARRA 
is certainly a major step in the right direction, but a 
continued large-scale commitment will be needed 
beyond the two years budgeted through the ARRA. 
                                                 
38 See Debrezion, Pels, & Rietveld (2007) and Bowes & Ihlanfeldt (2001). 
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We do have useful experiences on which to draw 
from the federal government’s current program that 
is aimed at improving public transportation services 
available to low-income people and reducing the 
fares of such services. This is the Job Access and 
Reverse Commute Program (JARC), which was estab-
lished in 1998, “to address the unique transporta-
tion challenges faced by welfare recipients and low-
income persons seeking to obtain and maintain em-
ployment,” according to the U.S. Federal Transit Ad-
ministration. When the country’s welfare policies 
were overhauled in 1997, JARC was created specifi-
cally to assist welfare recipients to connect with job 
opportunities by making transportation to jobs much 
more accessible. The U.S. Government Accountability 
Office reported in 1998 that three-fourths of welfare 
recipients were living in central cities or rural areas, 
while two-thirds of new entry-level jobs were located 
in suburbs (GAO, Public Transportation, 2006, 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06910t.pdf, p. 6). Since 
its inception, the program has evolved to offer trans-
portation services more broadly among low-income 
people, though the focus has been maintained on 
facilitating access to employment opportunities. For 
fiscal year 2009, federal JARC funding is $165 mil-
lion. These funds are then matched on an equal ba-
sis by state and local support within the communities 
in which JARC services are provided. 
For 2006, the JARC program provided about 23 mil-
lion one-way trips overall. At a total cost of about 
$280 million, this meant that the average cost per 
ride under JARC was about $12. By contrast, the cost 
per ride for non-JARC transportation services aver-
aged about $10 in 2006. The program is therefore 
relatively expensive to administer in terms of this 
cost measure alone. At the same time, the benefits 
of the program have also been substantial. According 
to a 2008 survey of JARC users, 27 percent reported 
that they were able to newly enter the labor force 
due to the services provided by JARC. Forty-one per-
cent of JARC users were workers who already had 
jobs, but were able to earn more as a result of the 
services provided by JARC. About 12 percent of JARC 
users reported being able to access new destina-
tions for employment that previously had been inac-
cessible (Thakuriah et al. 2008, p. 22). Given these 
results, it is fair to conclude that the JARC program 
does, at the least, offer important lessons as to how 
to develop public transportation systems in ways that 
benefit low-income households. These gains for low-
income households, moreover, are in addition to the 
important environmental benefits that accrue from 
raising the share of public transportation use 
throughout the U.S.  
It is beyond the scope of this study to examine in 
depth the most cost effective means for making pub-
lic transportation broadly accessible and affordable 
for low-income people. However, in addition to con-
sidering the relatively small-scale JARC program, we 
can also gain valuable perspectives by considering 
the regions of the country where public transporta-
tion is already utilized extensively, by low-income 
people as well as the population more generally. 
Thus, in Table 13, we have listed five major cities—
New York, Washington DC, Boston, San Francisco, 
and Chicago—where at least 25 percent of residents 
rely primarily on public transportation for commuting. 
As Table 13 also shows, in Los Angeles, only 11 per-
cent of residents rely on public transportation for 
commuting. Thus, as a general approach, we can 
learn from the positive cases of New York, Washing-
ton, Boston, San Francisco, and Chicago, as well as 
from the negative example of Los Angeles in develop-
ing effective public transportation systems—i.e. sys-
tems that can succeed in delivering both 
environmental benefits and improved living stan-
dards for low-income people.  
TABLE 13. PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION USE FOR WORK  
COMMUTES 2005-07 
Percentage of workers who use public transit to commute to work 
New York  54.6%  San Francisco  32.2% 
Washington, DC  37.8%  Chicago  25.9% 
Boston 32.5%  Los  Angeles  11.0% 
Source: 2005-2007 American Community Survey, U.S. Census Bu-
reau,  factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_submenuId= 
factsheet_0&_sse=on 
Overall then, the transportation component of the 
clean-energy investment agenda can contribute as a 
significant pathway out of poverty. But to do so, it will 
be imperative to build on the knowledge available as 
to how to make public transportation a truly viable 
option for low-income people. 




Probably the single most fundamental policy chal-
lenge for the next generation is to build a clean-
energy economy and defeat the threat of global cli-
mate change. The overarching strategies for achiev-
ing this aim are clear: to make massive investments 
every year in energy efficiency and renewable energy, 
and to establish limits on the pollution from the pro-
duction and consumption of oil, coal and natural gas, 
to reflect the environmental damages inflicted 
through burning fossil fuels.  
As we are becoming increasingly focused on this en-
vironmental agenda, we also need to recognize that 
this project—as with all economic policy initiatives—
will generate effects beyond those that define its 
central mission. The question we have pursued in 
this paper is the extent to which clean-energy in-
vestments may serve to raise living standards for 
low-income people in this country, i.e. create new 
‘pathways out of poverty’ for the 78 million people in 
this country who are presently poor or near-poor. This 
is about 25 percent of the entire U.S. population. 
Our study has focused on three basic channels 
through which a clean-energy investment agenda 
can indeed significantly improve living conditions for 
low-income households: by significantly expanding 
employment opportunities, especially for people with 
relatively low formal educational credentials; by low-
ering heating and utility bills through building retro-
fits; and by increasing access to public transpor- 
tation. Table 14 summarizes our main findings in the 
three areas of employment effects, building retrofits, 
and public transportation.  
In exploring these connections, a few central facts 
have emerged. The first and most important is that 
spending a given amount of money on building a 
clean-energy economy will create roughly three times 
more jobs within the United States than spending the 
same amount of money within our existing fossil fuel 
infrastructure. As shown in our study with CAP, in the 
context of an annual $150 billion dollar-for-dollar 
investment shift out of fossil fuels and into clean en-
ergy, this difference nets out to about 1.7 million 
jobs. Most of these jobs will pay at least decently or 
offer good prospects for job training, raises and pro-
motions. We can ensure that all the jobs provide at 
least minimally decent opportunities through combin-
ing the clean-energy agenda and job training pro-
grams with living wage standards and fair access to 
union representation.  
The net increase of 1.7 million jobs throughout the 
U.S. economy, including nearly half that are accessi-
ble to workers with relatively low formal educational 
credentials, can itself drive down the unemployment 
rate by about one percentage point, from, say, six to 
five percent. This in turn improves workers’ bargain-
ing power, including their power to fight for better 
training programs, union representation, and living 
wage standards. In this context, the transformation 
to a clean-energy economy can serve as a major 
long-term engine for expanding decent job opportuni-
ties in the U.S. This, in turn, is the single most effec-
tive tool for moving people out of poverty and into 
productive working lives.  
TABLE 14. SUMMARY OF BENEFITS FROM CLEAN-ENERGY 
INVESTMENT PROGRAM FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS  
1) Moving from  
unemployment to em-
ployment 
• 1.7 million new jobs overall 
• 870,000 jobs for workers with low 
education credentials 
• Newly employed low-income workers 
can lift themselves and family out of 
poverty 
2) Falling unemployment 
produces rising wages 
• Average low-income worker could  
see a rise in earnings of about 2% as 
unemployment rate falls 1% 
3) Building retrofits lower 
home heating and utility 
bills 
• Retrofits could reduce living costs up 
to 4 percent, depending on the climate 
and quality of current housing stock.  
• Requires well-designed policies to 
create market for retrofits for home-
owners and renters so benefits of  
retrofits are shared by renters 
4) Improved public 
transportation 
• Accessibility of public transportation 
could improve considerably through 
targeted investments  
• Increasing public transportation use 
in urban centers to around 25% to 50% 
of total could reduce living costs by 
about 1-4% 
• Households able to replace a car 
through increased public transit use 
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If managed correctly, a clean-energy investment 
agenda can also lower overall energy costs for con-
sumers, especially benefitting lower-income house-
holds, even as we necessarily impose limits on the 
burning of fossil fuels. The channels here are 
through retrofitting home residences to raise energy 
efficiency as well as substantially improving access 
to public transportation.  
Considering the full array of policy channels we have 
presented in this study, the main conclusion we 
reach is that the transition to a clean-energy econ-
omy has the capacity to merge the aims of environ-
mental protection, broadening economic opportunity 
and poverty reduction through powerful and mutually 
reinforcing connections. The clean-energy invest-
ment agenda, in other words, holds the promise of 
delivering a wide range of fundamental economic 
and environmental gains across all segments of the 
U.S. population.  




Characteristics of Low-Income Households  
EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
The data presented in Table 1 in the main report on the em-
ployment conditions of low-income households are estimated 
from the 2008 Annual Social and Economic survey (ASEC) 
and the 2008 March basic monthly survey of the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Current Population Survey (CPS).  
The CPS is a monthly household survey conducted for the 
B u r e a u  o f  L a bo r  S t a ti s t i c s  b y  t h e  U . S .  C e n s u s  B u r e a u .  T h e  
basic monthly survey of the CPS collects information from 
about 50,000 households every month on a wide range of 
topics including current employment status, wages and work 
schedules. The ASEC survey, conducted only in March as a 
supplement to the March basic monthly survey, provides addi-
tional data on family structure, all income sources, public 
subsidies, and poverty status for the prior calendar year (e.g., 
the data in the 2008 ASEC refer to income from 2007). The 
ASEC survey also provides information on respondents’ em-
ployment conditions during the prior year. 
For the purposes of understanding the average employment 
conditions of low- and higher- income households, we assign 
households’ low- and higher- income status by using a CPS-
provided poverty ratio that is equal to the household’s total 
annual income in 2007 divided by their appropriate official 
poverty income threshold for 2007. We assume that a house-
hold’s poverty ratio in 2007 is a good proxy for their poverty 
ratio in 2008. The employment situation of the members of 
these households is defined by their current employment 
status in 2008, using the standard BLS categories.  
The households in our sample include both primary family 
households—households containing a householder and at 
least one other related person, as well as single person 
households. Other types of families include related subfami-
lies, unrelated subfamilies, and secondary individuals. We 
treat related subfamilies as part of the primary family instead 
of as a separate unit. The remaining two categories are ex-
cluded from the sample. We exclude these last two catego-
ries, unrelated subfamilies and secondary individuals 
because these types of families and individuals can include 
household guests or lodgers who should be accounted for in 
their primary residence. 
We restrict our sample to households with at least one prime 
working age adult (25 years to 54 years old) in order to focus 
our analysis on individuals that depend primarily on paid em-
ployment for their livelihoods. We exclude workers below 25 
years old because they have a high likelihood of being de-
pendent on parental support, if in varying degrees. We ex-
clude workers older than 54 years old because a significant 
number of these workers likely depend on some form of re-
tirement income.  
We estimate wage rates from the ASEC data on workers’ earn-
ings over the last calendar year, their total number of weeks 
worked, and their usual weekly hours. From these data, a 
wage rate can be calculated by: annual earnings/(total weeks 
worked x usual weekly hours).  
CHARACTERISTICS OF REPRESENTATIVE CASES 
We used the same approach as above to define household 
types. We then used the 2008 ASEC data to estimate the 
characteristics of each representative household presented in 
Tables 7 and 8 in the main text. We assume that these house-
holds’ incomes come mainly from their wages and salaries.  
We used the 2008 1040 Individual Income Tax Form and 
Instruction Booklet to derive the figures for federal income tax 
liability and tax credits (www.irs.gov).  
We estimate a FICA tax equal to 7.65 percent. This includes a 
social security tax of 6.2 percent and a Medicare tax of 1.45 
percent (U.S. BLS, 2006). 
Our estimate of the cost of childcare for Case 2 is based on 
EPI’s 2008 basic family budget figures for a four-person, two-
child family (www.epi.org/content/ budget_calculator). We 
take the average of the proportion of childcare costs to total 
expenses for this family type (about 25 percent) and then 
adjust this to reflect that the primary caretaker in our repre-
sentative family works 3/4 time (30 hours weekly), rather 
than full time. Therefore, we estimate that childcare costs will 
equal roughly 20 percent of the household’s total income (25 
percent x 75 percent = 19 percent).  
Employment Estimates 
EMPLOYMENT MULTIPLIERS  
Data and Methodology. The employment estimates in this 
report are derived from an input-output model. The input-
output model allows us to observe relationships between dif-
ferent industries in the production of goods and services. We 
can also observe relationships between consumers of goods 
and services, including households and governments, and the 
various producing industries. For our purposes specifically, the 
input-output modeling approach enables us to estimate the 
effects on employment resulting from an increase in final de-
mand for the products of a given industry. For example, we can 
estimate the number of jobs directly created in the construc-
tion industry for each $1 million of spending on construction. 
We can also estimate the jobs that are indirectly created in 
other industries through the $1 million in spending on con-
struction—industries such as lumber and hardware. Overall, 
the input-out-put model allows us to estimate the economy-
wide employment results from a given level of spending.  
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For this report, we used the IMPLAN 2.0 software and IMPLAN 
2007 data set constructed by the Minnesota IMPLAN Group, 
Inc. This data provides 440-industry level detail and is based 
on the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (BEA) input-output tables. IMPLAN provides this 
data at zip-code and congressional district levels, therefore 
we were able to model the national economy as well as met-
ropolitan areas and congressional districts.  
Modifications to the Data. We made three significant modifi-
cations to the existing data. The IMPLAN data set, like the BEA 
data, do not recognize certain energy industries such as wind, 
solar, or building weatherization. We therefore constructed a 
number of energy industries from this existing data. The de-
tails of this are below. Secondly, there was a an error in the 
IMPLAN data which would have affected any of the estimates 
that contained the construction industry. Two of the construc-
tion sectors – residential repair and non-residential repair 
construction – had employment multipliers that varied drasti-
cally from the other construction sectors and from these 
same sectors in previous years. It was therefore necessary to 
adjust the employment multipliers and we did so by replacing 
the employment/output ratio in both of these sectors with the 
average of all other construction sectors. This yielded em-
ployment multipliers that were consistent with those obtained 
using 2005 and 2006 data. 
Finally, at the national level, all 440 industries have a signifi-
cant amount of employment and output. At the district level, 
however, some industries have negligible employment, and 
the employment/output ratios and resulting employment mul-
tipliers are often unrealistically high or low. To correct for this 
bias, when employment in an industry was less than 100 
p e o p l e  i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t ,  w e  r e placed the district’s employ-
ment/output ratio with the national employment/output ratio. 
This mainly affected the direct employment estimates (though 
in some cases not at all, since employment in some industries 
was zero). All other district information was preserved, there-
fore inter-industry relationships remained unchanged, and 
indirect and induced employment changed only proportionally 
to the change in direct employment. 
Induced Effects. The input-output model allows us to estimate 
both the direct job creation and the indirect job creation that 
result from an increase in demand to one industry or a group 
of industries. It is much more difficult to estimate the size of 
the induced employment effects—or what is also commonly 
termed “multiplier effects”—than to estimate direct and indi-
rect employment effects of a program such as the $150 bil-
lion program we propose. Of course, we know that when 
hundreds of thousands more people become employed di-
rectly and indirectly through a clean-energy program, those 
people will spend most of the money they have newly earned 
on other products in the economy. Moreover, we have a good 
sense of what percentage of the additional income people 
receive will be spent by them—between about 97 percent and 
99 percent.39 
But how much this extra spending will mean in terms of over-
all job creation depends on the existing conditions in the 
economy, including how many people are unemployed, what 
the inflation rate is, what is happening with oil prices, the size 
of the government’s fiscal deficit, the size of the economy’s 
trade deficit, and whether the increase in government spend-
ing is targeted to either encourage or discourage private-
sector investment. A 2002 article by economists at the Inter-
national Monetary Fund surveyed the professional literature 
estimating the size of the induced effects in the United 
States, among other economies, in a range of circumstances 
and time periods.40 They report wide variations in these esti-
mates. This includes some estimates of a negative induced 
effect—an overall expansion of less than $150 billion resulting 
from an initial $150 billion program—to a doubling of the ini-
tial expansion—$300 billion in overall expansion emerging out 
of an initial $150 billion stimulus. 
The clean-energy program we propose is designed specifically 
to generate a large induced expansion of jobs. This is be-
cause the economy at present is operating with high unem-
ployment, with plenty of slack resources to be utilized; spend-
ing will be focused on domestic industries rather than 
imports; and it aims specifically to encourage private-sector 
investment rather than relying on government spending. 
Given these factors, one might expect that the induced effect 
would be closer to the higher end estimates of the IMF study—
that the total number of jobs would be double the level of 
direct and indirect job creation. Nevertheless, to be cautious, 
it is appropriate to underestimate rather than overestimate 
the induced employment effect, even if the program is de-
signed, and conditions are favorable, for a relatively large 
induced effect. We therefore assume that the induced em-
ployment effects of this clean-energy program will add forty 
percent to the overall level of job creation generated by the 
direct and indirect effects nationwide. This is in line with the 
lower-end estimate of such effects for the U.S. economy re-
ported in the IMF survey study. 
While the forty percent induced effect has a straightforward 
application at the national level, it becomes more compli-
cated at the district level (or metropolitan area) due to re-
gional trading patterns. A district which imports a high 
percentage of its goods from outside the district will have 
lower induced job creation than a district that imports a 
smaller percentage of its goods and buys more “domestically-
produced” goods and services. Thus, to account for these 
                                                 
39 Based on BEA data for personal disposable income and outlays 
(personal consumption, interest payments, and transfer payments to 
governments and the rest of the world) for 2006-2008. 
40 Hemming, Kell, and Mahfouz (2002). 
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differences, we adjusted the 0.4 induced effect by two distinct 
measures of regional trade.  
First, the household spending patterns within IMPLAN contain 
a domestic trade sector. Thus, the employment multiplier 
generated by $1 million in household consumption accounts 
for inter-regional trade. We calculated the output and em-
ployment that would result from this level of expenditure, net 
of trade, and then scaled the employment effects to 40% of 
the direct plus indirect job creation. As a second approach, we 
used the ratio of exports/imports for each region and multi-
plied that by 0.4*(direct + indirect job creation). So a region 
with more exports than imports will have induced job creation 
that is higher than 40%, and a region with net imports will 
have lower than 40% induced effects. The results of these two 
methods were fairly similar, and rather than selecting one 
method over another, we averaged the two results to deter-
mine induced job creation by district (or metropolitan area). 
Imputed Indirect Employment. At the national level there are 
only three levels of job creation: direct, indirect, and induced. 
But at the district level (or metropolitan area), some of the 
indirect effects that result from trade are not captured in the 
input-output model. For example, if a construction project in 
location X uses lumber produced in location Y, then this indi-
rect job creation (for lumber) occurs in region Y and of course 
should not be counted in total job creation in region X. How-
ever, if the lumber produced in region Y comes from forests in 
region X, then there is a second-round indirect effect that is 
not being captured, and which should be accounted for in the 
total job creation in region X. 
We therefore define a category of job creation called “imputed 
indirect.” We measure this by comparing the total job creation 
per district (or metropolitan area) to the total job creation na-
tionally. While district-level (or metropolitan-area-level) direct 
effects can be either lower or higher than the national direct 
effects, the district-level indirect effects are lower in all cases. 
But of course, nationally all the indirect effects in each district 
should sum up to the national indirect effects. To account for 
some of this gap, we inflate each district’s indirect jobs by the 
proportion of total district jobs to total national jobs. This 
yields, for each district, a number of imputed indirect jobs.  
Definition of Energy Industries. The BEA input-output tables 
organize industries according to the North American Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS). This system, unfortunately, 
does not identify energy industries as such. While certain 
industries such as oil and gas extraction or coal mining are 
identified in the tables, others such as wind and solar are not. 
Furthermore, the oil and gas industry does not consist solely 
of extraction but also of research, manufacturing and distribu-
tion. Therefore for both identified and unidentified energy 
industries we must make certain assumptions in using the 
input-output tables to study output and employment. 
For each energy strategy, we identified the industries most 
relevant to the strategy and assigned weights for the share of 
that industry within the energy strategy. These weights were 
chosen based on various industry journals and energy re-
ports, as well as our best judgment when information was 
unavailable. So, for example, we defined the coal industry as 
44% coal extraction, 8% support activities for coal mining, and 
48% coal products manufacturing. In this way, we were able 
to use weighted averages of the figures in the output and 
employment tables to generate estimates of output and em-
ployment in the coal industry, given a certain level of demand 
for that industry’s product. In order to ensure that our em-
ployment estimates for each energy strategy were not driven 
primarily by the weights we assigned, we ran the model with 
various alternative weighting schemes and found that the 
results were in fact quite robust and varied only slightly even 
when weights changed quite drastically. The final weights that 
we selected for each energy strategy are listed at the end of 
this section. 
In order to be able to compare employment estimates be-
tween various energy strategies, we needed a common metric 
to use as a basis for comparison. We chose to compare job 
estimates in relation to a given amount of spending, rather 
than a given amount of energy production. So, for instance, 
we compare the employment estimates in solar energy versus 
coal by showing how the same level of spending in each cate-
gory results in a certain number of jobs. The alternative, which 
is to show how many jobs are supported by a given level of 
energy production, would produce inflated estimates in indus-
tries with high energy costs. If we had used a given level of 
BTUs as the basis for comparison, then the number of jobs 
needed to produce a given level of BTUs in solar would be 
very high compared to the number of jobs needed to produce 
that level of energy production through coal. This would have 
simply been due to the fact that the cost per BTU for solar 
p o w e r  i s  s t i l l  m u c h  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  c o s t  p e r  B T U  o f  c o a l .  
Therefore, we chose to compare the number of jobs created 
by a given level of spending, which is not sensitive to the cur-
rent prices of these various energy sources and technologies. 
ENERGY INDUSTRIES – SECTORS AND WEIGHTS 
Biomass 
25%    grain farming 
25%    logging 
25%    other new construction 
12.5% refining 
12.5% scientific research and development 
Building Weatherization 
50%    non-residential repair construction 
50%    residential repair construction 
 




44%    coal mining 
08%    support activities for coal mining 
48%    coal product manufacturing 
Oil and Gas 
23%    oil and gas extraction 
07%    drilling oil and gas wells 
04%    support activities for oil and gas extraction 
10%    natural gas distribution 
45%    petroleum refineries 
08%    petroleum product manufacturing 
03%    pipeline transport 
Smart Grid 
25%    construction 
25%    machinery 
25%    electronic equipment 
12.5% electrical power goods 
12.5% storage batteries 
Solar 
30%    construction 
17.5% hardware manufacturing 
17.5% electrical equipment 
17.5% electronic components 
17.5% scientific and technical services 
Transit/Rail 
45%    other construction 
10%    rail transportation 
45%    ground passenger transportation 
Wind 
26%    construction 
12%    plastic products 
12%    fabricated metal  
37%    machinery 
03%    mechanical power transmission equipment 
03%    electronic components 
07%    scientific and technical services 
Clean-Energy Program 
40%     building weatherization 
20%     transit/rail 
10%     smart grid 
10%     wind 
10%     solar 




XX%  oil and gas 
YY%  coal  
Where XX and YY are determined according to the 2007 out-
put level of these industries in each district 
Characteristics of Jobs Generated by Clean-Energy 
Investments and Fossil Fuel Investments  
In this report, we are concerned not only with the overall level 
of job creation, but specifically with the types of occupations 
and the credentials needed by workers in these occupations.  
Our basic strategy for identifying the types of jobs that would 
be added to the economy due to an investment in the clean-
energy or fossil fuel sectors (as defined above) involves two 
steps. The first step is to calculate each industry’s share of 
total employment created through either an investment in 
clean energy or fossil fuels. We calculated the percentage of 
new employment generated in each of the 440 sectors in our 
input-output model. These industry shares take into account 
the direct, indirect, and induced effects as discussed above. 
The second step is to combine this information on the indus-
try composition of new employment created by investing in 
each energy sector—clean energy or fossil fuels—with data on 
workers currently employed in the industries. We use the 
characteristics of these workers to determine the types of 
occupations (and the credential requirements of these occu-
pations) that will add jobs with an investment in each energy 
sector. Our data on current workers comes from the 2008 
Current Population Survey (CPS) described above. 
Specifically, we used the industry shares to weight the worker 
data in the CPS so that the industry composition of the work-
ers in the CPS sample matches the industry composition of 
the new jobs that will be added by investing in the energy 
sector we are analyzing. We do this by using the industry 
shares to adjust the CPS-provided sampling weights. The CPS-
provided sampling weights weight the survey sample so that it 
is nationally representative. We use the industry shares to 
adjust these sampling weights so that the sample of workers 
in the CPS is representative of the industrial mix of jobs that 
IMPLAN estimates will be produced by new investments in 
clean energy or fossil fuels.  
In order to create the weights we first aggregated the 440 
industry shares to the 3-digit level NAICS industries (for a total 
of 69 industries). This allowed us to merge the industry share 
data to the CPS worker data using the most detailed industry 
variable provided in the CPS. So, for example, at the 440 sec-
tor level there are 7 construction sectors, while at the 3-digit 
NAICS level there is 1 construction industry. In Table A1 we 
present the industry shares for the clean-energy and fossil 
fuel sectors.  
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farms 3.88%  1.10% 
forestry, fishing, and related activities  1.03%  0.10% 
mining 
oil and gas extraction  0.28%  15.77% 
mining, except oil and gas  0.27%  1.55% 
support activities for mining  0.01%  0.25% 
utilities 0.26%  2.27% 
construction 25.69%  7.68% 
manufacturing: durable goods 
wood products  0.81%  0.21% 
nonmetallic mineral products  0.61%  0.23% 
primary metals  0.47%  0.38% 
fabricated metal products  2.17%  1.65% 
machinery 1.66%  0.63% 
computer and electronic products  1.59%  0.18% 
electrical equipment, appliances, and  
components  0.85% 0.20% 
motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and 
parts 0.28%  0.31% 
other transportation equipment  0.04%  0.03% 
furniture and related products  0.23%  0.09% 
miscellaneous manufacturing  0.15%  0.19% 
manufacturing: nondurable goods 
food and beverage and tobacco products  0.48%  0.50% 
textile mills and textile product mills  0.09%  0.08% 
apparel and leather and allied products  0.07%  0.08% 
paper products  0.18%  0.24% 
printing and related support activities  0.20%  0.28% 
petroleum and coal products  0.14%  2.19% 
chemical products  0.37%  1.17% 
plastics and rubber products 0.81%  0.51% 














motor vehicle and parts dealers  0.79%  0.63% 
food and beverage stores  1.05%  0.85% 
general merchandise stores  1.07%  0.87% 
other retail  3.72%  3.00% 
transportation and warehousing 
air transportation  0.14%  0.17% 
rail transportation  0.42%  0.23% 
water transportation  0.02%  0.04% 
truck transportation  1.20%  1.40% 
transit and ground passenger  
transportation 8.80%  0.25% 
pipeline transportation  0.02%  0.96% 
other transportation and support activities  0.62%  0.83% 
warehousing and storage  0.33%  0.33% 
information 
publishing industries (includes software)  0.29%  0.37% 
motion picture and sound recording  
industries 0.15%  0.18% 
broadcasting and telecommunications  0.67%  0.86% 
information and data processing services  0.12%  0.15% 
finance and insurance 
federal reserve banks, credit  
intermediation, and related activities  1.32%  1.96% 
insurance carriers and related activities  1.02%  1.15% 
funds, trusts, securities, commodity  
contracts, and other investments  1.87% 2.50% 
real estate and rental and leasing, and other financial vehicles 
real estate  2.70%  3.48% 
rental and leasing services and lessors of 
intangible assets  0.50%  1.02% 
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professional, scientific, and technical services 
legal services  0.90%  1.49% 
computer systems design and related  
services  0.11% 0.16% 
miscellaneous professional, scientific, and 
technical services  6.00%  7.64% 
management of companies and enterprises  1.04%  3.22% 
administrative and waste management services 
administrative and support services  4.82%  7.27% 
waste management and remediation  
services 0.18%  0.22% 
educational services  0.75%  0.76% 
health care and social assistance 
ambulatory health care services  1.85%  1.85% 
hospitals 1.28%  1.28% 
nursing and residential care facilities  0.94%  0.94% 
social assistance  0.96%  0.96% 
arts, entertainment, and recreation 
performing arts, spectator sports,  
museums, and related activities  0.58% 0.69% 
amusements, gambling, and recreation 
industries 0.54%  0.59% 
accommodation and food services     
accommodation 0.51%  0.63% 
aood services and drinking places  3.23%  3.80% 
other services, except government  4.26%  4.83% 
government 
 federal  0.09%  0.12% 
 state and local  0.40%  0.61% 




We adjust the CPS-provided sampling weights by multiplying 




where S i s a s cal ar  equal  to the number  of jobs pr oduced  
overall by the particular level and type of investment being 
considered. For example, in our analysis of the job character-
istics of the employment generated by a national $150 billion 
investment in the clean-energy sector, S is equal to 
2,505,732. 
We use these adjusted sampling weights to estimate the pro-
portion of workers in each energy sector that has 1) a high 
school degree, and no college experience, 2) some college, 
but no B.A. degree, and 3) a BA degree or more. We then as-
sume that the same proportion of jobs in each energy sector 
requires each level of education credentials. These figures 
are presented in the main text in Tables 3 and 6.  
The average (median) wage data presented in Tables 3 and 6 
in the main text are based on the 2008 CPS outgoing rotation 
files (ORG) of the basic monthly survey. These data files have 
detailed information about hourly rates for hourly-paid work-
ers, and weekly earnings and weekly hours for non-hourly paid 
workers. We divide weekly earnings by weekly hours to esti-
mate hourly rates for non-hourly paid workers. For some non-
h o u r l y  p a i d  w o r k e r s ,  w e  d o  n o t  h a v e  d a t a  o n  t h e i r  u s u a l  
weekly hours (some report usual hours vary). For these work-
ers, we impute their usual weekly hours by assigning their 
actual hours worked as their usual hours worked if their ac-
tual hours worked is consistent with what they report is their 
usual work schedule – part-time or full-time. For example, if a 
worker reports that his hours usually vary, but he reports that 
he worked 15 hours last week and that he usually works part-
time, we impute that worker’s usual hours to be 15 hours per 
week. However, if this worker reports that he usually works 
full-time, we assigned his usual hours as missing. Roughly five 
percent of the hours, and thus hourly wages, in our data set 
are imputed in this fashion. 
Impact on Living Standards from Transportation 
Savings 
COST SAVINGS AVERAGED OVER ALL  
LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
In this section, we explain how we estimate the impact on the 
living standards of low-income households of using public 
transportation to meet 25 percent of their transportation 
needs.  
We do not have direct data on the number of miles travelled 
by public and private transit in low-income households which 
  IMPLAN’s estimate of the share of  
new jobs in a worker’s industry I 
∑ (CPS sampling weights of all workers in industry I)  S x 
GREEN PROSPERITY / PAGE 37  
 
 
we could then use to estimate cost-savings from travelling 
more by public transit. In order to estimate the miles travelled 
by each mode of transportation, we use the following equa-
tion that relates the data presented in Table 12 and the num-
ber of miles that the household travels annually. We can then 
use this equation to estimate the number of miles traveled by 







Table 12 provides data on the percent of private transit ex-
penses, public transit expenses, and total household spend-
ing on transportation. In the main text of the report, we 
provide estimates of the cost per private transit mile ($0.54 
per mile) and the cost per public transit mile ($0.22 per mile). 
Inserting these figures into equation 1, we derive the total 




where 5,696 miles are traveled by private transit (87.7% of 
total) and 795 miles are traveled by public transit (12.3% of 
total).  
To shift to a mix of 75 percent of household miles traveled by 
private transit and 25 percent traveled by public transit, we 
simply shift travel miles by transit type to fit the 75/25 mix, 
re-arrange equation 1, and calculate the new total budget: 
 
 
Based on these calculations, we estimate that the average 
low-income household’s overall transportation budget will fall 
from $3,240 to $2,977, a decrease of $263. The $263 sav-
ings is equal to 1.3 percent of the average low-income house-
hold’s total spending ($263/$20,471 = 1.3 percent). An 
analogous calculation for households in the 21-40% income 
group of Table 12 produces a savings of about $560, or 1.8 
percent of these households’ total spending. The impact of 
shifting to a mix of 50 percent of miles traveled by private 
transit and 50 percent of miles traveled by public transit, we 
simply shift travel miles by transit type, and re-calculate the 
household’s total transportation budget again.  
 
 
This is equal to an overall change in transportation expenses 
of $781 ($3,240-$2,459=$781), or a savings equal to 3.8 
percent of total household spending ($781/$20,471 = 3.8 
percent). 
COST SAVINGS AVERAGED BY NUMBER OF CARS 
OWNED AMONG LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
As discussed in the main text of the report, costs savings vary 
dramatically depending on whether a household decides to 
replace a car with public transit or not.  
(% private transit expenses) x total transit budget 
cost per private transit mile 
(% public transit expenses. x total transit budget) 
cost per public transit mile 
= total miles traveled 
+ 
We explain here how we estimate the cost savings for a low-
income household that decides to go from one to no car and 
for a low-income household that decides to go from two cars to 
one car. According to the 2001 National Household Transpor-
tation Survey, among low-income households (defined as 
households with incomes of less than $20,000 in 2001) 27 
percent owned no cars, 48 percent owned one car, 18 percent 
owned two cars, and 8 percent owned more than two cars.  
Low-Income Households with One Car.  We know from the 
figures above that the average low-income household spends 
about $3,065 on private transit and $175 on public transit, 
for a total of $3,240. We also know that the typical low-
income household owns one car. Therefore, we assume that 
$3,065 represents the costs of owning and using one car. If 
this household got rid of their one car, this would reduce their 
private transit expenses to zero and all of the 6,471 miles 
would now be travelled by public transit. Therefore, their new 
transportation costs would be equal to $1,424 (6,471 x 
$0.22 per mile). This households transportation budget is 
$1,816 lower, or a savings equal to 8.9 percent of total 
household spending ($1,816/$20,471 = 8.9 percent). 
(94.6% x 3,240) 
$0.54/mile 
(5.4% x $3,240) 
$0.22/mile 
= 6,471 miles  + 
 
Low-Income Households with Two Cars. If $3,065 represents 
the costs of owning and using one car, then we know that 70 
percent of this cost is fixed ($2,145) and 30 percent of this 
cost is variable ($920). Therefore, if this household owns two 
cars, then their fixed costs would be about $4,290 and as-
suming that all of the 6,471 miles of travel are by private 
transit, their total transportation budget would be about 
$5,390 ($4,290 + (6,471 miles x $0.17 per mile) = $5,390). 
If this household got rid of one car, then their fixed costs 
would fall by half, or $2,145. That is, their total fixed costs 
would now be $2,145.  We assume that half of the 6,471 
miles they travel would now be completed by public transit 
and half by private transit. The costs associated with these 
travel miles add $550 to cover private transit miles and $712 
to cover public transit miles. In total, this household’s new 
transportation budget is $3,471 ($2,145 + $550 + $712 = 
$3,471). Overall, the household’s transportation budget is 
about $1,970 lower, or a savings equal to 9.6 percent of total 
household spending ($1,970/$20,471 = 9.6 percent). 
[(75% x 6,471 miles) x $0.54/mile] + 
[(25% x 6,471 miles) x $0.22/mile] = $2,977 
  [(50% x 6,471 miles) x $0.54/mile] + 
[(50% x 6,471 miles) x $0.22/mile] = $2,459 
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Impact on Emissions from Increasing  
Public Transit Use 
We estimate the overall reduction in emissions by raising 
public transit use to 25 percent of overall transportation by 
combining the following data:  
  From our calculations above, we estimate that low-income 
households use private transportation roughly 90 percent 
of the time and public transit about 10 percent of the 
time.    
  Private transportation generates roughly 61 percent of the 
total emissions generated by transportation.41 
  Transportation generates roughly 34 percent of total 
emissions.42  
  Public transportation use produces 45 percent less 
emissions than private transit, taking account the impact 
of reduced traffic congestion.43 
Working from these figures we estimate that the share of total 
emissions generated by private transportation is equal to 
20.7 percent (61 percent x 34 percent). If public transit rep-
resent 10 percent of all transportation use but produces 55 
percent of the emissions of private transit, we can calculate 
the share of total emissions produced by public transit im-
plied by these figures to be 1.3 percent ([(20.7 percent/90 
percent) x 10 percent] x 55 percent = 1.3 percent).  
We then assume that the private/public transit mix shifts to 
75/25. Then the percentage of total emissions produced by 
private transit would fall by 3.4 percent to 17.3 percent [(75 
percent /90 percent) x 20.7 percent = 17.3 percent]. The 
share of total emissions produced by public transit would rise 
to about 3.2 percent [(25 percent /10 percent) x 1.3 percent 
= 3.2 percent]. The new total share of emissions produced by 
public and private transit combined would be 20.5 percent, or 




                                                 
41 This figure is from the American Public Transportation Authority, 
see Table 2, “Table 2. U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Mobile 
Sources, by Vehicle Type (Tg CO2 Eq.),” see http://www.apta.com/ 
research/info/online/documents/climate_change.pdf . 
42 According to EIA statistics, transportation accounted for approxi-
mately 33.6% of carbon emissions in the U.S. in 2007, based on 
Table 6, "U.S. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions by End-Use 
Sector," see http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/carbon.html . 
43This figure is from the American Public Transportation Authority, see 
http://www.apta.com/research/info/online/documents/climate_ 
change.pdf . 
Energy Costs by Household Type 
The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) 
produces an annual Home Energy Notebook report (U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services, 2008) that provides 
some basic data on the energy costs of low-income families. 
The Home Energy Notebook provides average annual expen-
ditures on all residential energy which includes heating as 
well as other energy uses by region and by low-income status. 
They define low-income status as those households that meet 
the LIHEAP eligibility requirements: “the greater of 150 per-
cent of the poverty income guidelines and 60 percent of the 
State median income.” This group roughly overlaps with our 
definition of low income (200 percent or less of the official 
poverty line). 
 For these low-income families their average annual residen-
tial energy expenditures was $1,690 in Fiscal Year 2006. 
Adjusted by the CPI for home energy for urban consumers, 
this is equal to $1,916 in 2008 (inflation equal to 13.4 per-
cent for these items). 
To adjust for the fact that renters typically face lower energy 
costs than owners, we use the average energy costs for rent-
ers and owners from the 2007 American Housing Survey 
2007 to adjust energy costs by tenancy. Based on the 2007 
American Housing Survey figures, we estimate that energy 
costs for low-income renters is equal to 86 percent of the 
$1,916 in energy costs of all low-income housing units. For 
low-income owners, the figure is 110 percent of $1,916.44 
Therefore, we estimate annual home energy expenditures to 
be $1,648 (86 percent of $1,916) for low-income renters and 
$2,108 (110 percent of $1,916) for low-income owners. 
Regional Profiles 
In addition to the national estimates that we discuss in this 
report, we also produced a select number of regional esti-
mates of how low-income households may be impacted by an 
investment shift into clean energy. These estimates are avail-
able as individual regional fact sheets at www.peri.umass.edu. 
In this section, we explain how we regionalized our national 
estimates.  
EMPLOYMENT IMPACT BY REGION 
We begin by discussing the approach we have taken for allo-
cating both the expansion in clean-energy investments in 
each region and the corresponding decline in fossil fuel 
spending. It will be on the basis of estimating the amount of 
                                                 
44 We derive these ratios by comparing the 2007 AHS estimates of 
the monthly total costs across all low-income household units of oil, 
gas, and electricity among renters ($217) and owners ($277) and 
comparing this to the figure for all low-income units ($251). 
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money by which clean-energy investments increase and fossil 
fuel spending decreases in each area that we can then derive 
the net employment effects of the transition to a clean-energy 
economy.  
We have derived the $150 billion level of economy-wide 
clean-energy investment spending based on two criteria: 1) 
our assessment of the combined impact on the U.S. economy 
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the set 
of incentives and regulations included in the American Clean 
Energy and Security Act, now being debated in Congress; and 
2) developments that are likely to occur in the private clean-
energy investment market, driven primarily by advances in 
clean-energy technologies and the maturation of the institu-
tions and linkages serving this market. Of course, these two 
broad sets of factors—the impact of government policies and 
advances in technologies and market practices—are also 
closely interrelated.45  
To proceed with a regional breakdown of this $150 billion in 
total clean-energy investment spending throughout the U.S. 
economy, we first need to establish criteria for estimating how 
the funds are likely to be distributed. Correspondingly, based 
on the worst-case scenario assumption that we describe in 
the main text (page 16) that the total $150 billion in clean-
energy investments will be matched dollar-for-dollar by de-
clines in fossil fuel spending, we also need establish criteria 
for distributing the decline in fossil fuel spending across the 
regions that will total to $150 billion. In fact, we conclude that 
the same approach is appropriate for both distributing the 
gains in clean-energy investments and declines in fossil fuel 
spending. That is, as we explain in detail, we generate both 
the clean-energy investment increases and the fossil fuel 
spending declines as equally weighted averages of the level 
of GDP and the level of population in each region. 
Clean-Energy Investment Increases. One way to allocate the 
flow of clean-energy investment funds would be to make a 
determination as to which regions have advantages in various 
investment areas, such as solar or wind power, urban density 
for mass transit investments, or with agriculture to produce 
targeted advances in next-generation biofuels. But whatever 
funding assumptions we would establish from these criteria 
would inevitably be highly sensitive to our assumptions. That 
is, we do not have an empirically rigorous way to balance the 
importance of these geographic or climatic advantages for 
any given region relative to the economic resources available 
in other regions.  
With this in mind, we considered two approaches to assigning 
investment levels for each region based on two easily observ-
                                                 
45 Our treatment of the interrelationship between these two policy 
initiatives and private investment activity is developed more fully in 
our companion study with Center for American Progress (Pollin, 
Heintz, and Garrett-Peltier 2009). 
able and measurable traits for each area—i.e. local GDP and 
population levels. 
Distributing the total $150 billion in clean-energy investments 
on the basis of each region’s share of total GDP means as-
signing proportions of spending based on existing patterns of 
financial investments and levels of development. This pro-
vides an accurate measure of how clean-energy investments 
would flow if they followed current levels of economic devel-
opment across the regions. Distributing the funds based on 
each area’s population assumes a more egalitarian approach, 
with each person in the country effectively receiving an equal 
dollar claim on the overall pool of investment funds.  
We then try to balance these two considerations, recognizing 
that building retrofits, for example, will in part follow a pattern 
based on population density, but that new capital investment 
will also naturally flow toward areas of pre-existing capital 
investment in industry, infrastructure, and building stock. 
In our view, both a GDP-share and a population-based alloca-
tion of funds represent reasonable criteria for estimating what 
regional-level clean-energy investments should be. This is 
because, regardless of an area’s topography or climate, major 
opportunities for clean-energy investments exist now and will 
grow with time. Accordingly, our approach is to calculate what 
the allocation of new investment funds would be under both 
the GDP- and population-based approaches, and use the 
midpoint of these two calculations as our figure for each re-
gion’s allocation of the total $150 billion in new clean-energy 
investments.  
Fossil Fuel Spending Declines. Similar issues arise in deciding 
an approach for estimating the distribution of declines in fos-
sil fuel spending across the regions. One approach would be 
to distribute the cuts in proportion to the existing levels of 
fossil fuel spending in each area. According to this standard, 
areas in major oil-producing states such as Texas, Louisiana 
and Oklahoma and coal-producing regions such as Appala-
chia and Montana would experience larger overall spending 
reductions than other areas in which the fossil fuel industry 
plays a less significant role. Under this scenario, the costs of 
the transition from a fossil fuel- to a clean-energy based 
economy would therefore fall disproportionately on areas that 
have large-scale fossil fuel industries. But if we used this cri-
terion for allocating the distribution of fossil fuel spending 
declines, we would be contradicting a principle incorporated 
into the draft ACESA, which is to compensate people and 
communities tied to the fossil fuel industry as one feature of 
the transition to a clean-energy economy. 
Thus, to remain consistent with the policy approach incorpo-
rated into the ACESA, we follow the same principle that we 
used for allocating the spending increases in each region. 
That is, in our approach, the declines in fossil fuel spending in 
each region are distributed across regions as an equally 
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weighted average of each local area’s population and GDP. 
How could this weighting scheme be made compatible with 
the fact that the areas do have very different levels of fossil 
fuel expenditures? Following the principle of equitable im-
pacts across all regions, the simplest way is to assume that 
areas with larger than average fossil fuel industries will also 
be given disproportionate levels of compensation through the 
ACESA compensation programs. We would also assume that 
areas with relatively large fossil fuel industries will also re-
ceive a disproportionate level of government support for in-
vestments in clean energy, in particular clean-energy projects 
that are necessarily tied to specific locations, such as building 
retrofits, public transportation, and smart grid.  
ESTIMATING REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF JOBS 
GENERATED BY CLEAN-ENERGY INVESTMENTS AND 
FOSSIL FUEL INVESTMENTS  
For our regional profiles, we needed to make a few minor 
modifications to the methodology described above for esti-
mating the characteristics of jobs generated by clean-energy 
investments and fossil fuel investments.  
First, we pooled five years of CPS data (2004 to 2008) in 
order to obtain samples of sufficient size for analysis. Some 
local areas, however, could not be identified separately within 
the CPS data. In those cases, we used the next smallest geo-
graphic unit that includes the local area.  
For example, we estimate the average wage and the distribu-
tion of jobs across credential categories for Congressional 
District 4 of Arkansas from all workers in Arkansas, rather 
than within the District because the CPS does not separately 
identify workers residing within the District. The District’s 
workforce makes up a substantial share of Arkansas’ total 
workforce, just under one-quarter according to the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, so we believe that the worker characteristics of 
workers in Arkansas should reasonably approximate the 
worker characteristics of workers in the District. 
Second, the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not provide labor 
force statistics (unemployment and employment levels and 
rates) for all of the regions we analyze. In particular, the BLS 
does not provide congressional district-level estimates. The 
U.S. Census Bureau, based on survey data from the American 
Community Survey, does provide three-year-average district-
level estimates, the latest covers 2005 to 2007. In order to 
estimate current labor force numbers, we combine data from 
the BLS and Census Bureau in the following way.  
For each district, we calculate the ratio of the Census Bu-
reau’s district-level labor force estimates to its state-level 
labor force estimates. We then apply these ratios to the 2008 
state-level BLS labor force estimates to approximate the 
2008 district estimates. Take, for example, Arkansas Con-
gressional District 4. We present the figures we used to esti-
mate its labor force figures in Table A.2. We present the Cen-
sus Bureau three-year average estimates for the District in 
row 1, and for the whole state of Arkansas in row 2. Row 3 
shows how the District figures compare to the state figures. 
We can see that the District’s labor force and unemployment 
levels make up roughly one-quarter of the state’s levels. Row 
4 provides the current data on the state of Arkansas provided 
by the BLS. Finally, the fifth row presents our adjusted figures 
for the District. These figures are equal to the BLS figures in 
row 4 multiplied by the ratios in row 3. 
TABLE A2. ESTIMATING LABOR FORCE FIGURES FOR ARKANSAS 
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 4 
  # in labor force  # unemployed 
1. Arkansas Congressional 
District 4, ACS 2005-2007 
estimate  299,623 27,026 
2. Arkansas, ACS 2005-2007 
estimate  1,332,678 95,327 
3. Ratio (row 1/row 2)  0.225  0.28 
4. Arkansas, 2008 BLS  
estimate  1,370,259 69,717 
5. Arkansas Congressional 
District 4, estimate based on 
Arkansas 2008 BLS estimate 
adjusted by ratio (row 3 x row 4)  308,072  19,765 
6. Unemployment rate for  
Congressional District 4, using 
row 5 adjusted figures  
(col. 2/col. 1) 
6.4% 
(=19,765/ 
308,072)   
Sources: American Community Survey 2005-2007, U.S. Census Bu-
reau; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009 
To generating the state figures for jobs by educational creden-
tial level, we use two sets of estimates. The first set of esti-
mates is the national figures presented in the main report. 
The second set is directly estimated from state-level data. We 
combine these two sets of estimates to balance the strengths 
and weaknesses of each.46 
Both sets of estimates are based on a subset of the workers 
we want to observe, e.g., a sample of workers from each state 
rather than all the workers in each state. A sample of obser-
                                                 
46  Note that earlier estimates for only 21 states, released in June 
2009, have been revised. The earlier estimates were not adjusted by 
the national figures because this adjustment could only be made with 
a full set of estimates for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
Estimates of all 50 states and the District of Columbia—adjusted to 
reflect the methodology described here—were produced and released 
in July 2009. 
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vations always has the potential to produce different esti-
mates from what would be observed if we had information on 
all workers. Specifically, the characteristics of the workers in 
the sample will tend to be over-represented and the charac-
teristics of workers not in the sample will tend to be under-
represented. This is because the workers in the sample are 
assumed to represent all the workers we want to observe. 
These differences are referred to as sampling errors. 
The national estimates of the number of net jobs by educa-
tional credential level will tend to have smaller sampling errors 
than the state estimates. This is because the CPS 2008 na-
tional sample provides many more observations on workers in 
each of the 69 CPS-defined detailed industries that comprise 
the clean-energy and fossil fuels sectors (as described above) 
compared to the state samples. The national figures, however, 
cannot reflect state-specific labor market characteristics—that 
is, what kind of workers and jobs would be produced in each 
state given the types of industry expansions expected to occur 
with an increase in clean-energy investments.  
To provide these state-specific details we estimate the num-
ber of net jobs by educational credential level by state. In 
order to ensure that the range of detailed industries we use to 
define the clean-energy sector and fossil fuels sector are rep-
resented in our samples, we pool five years of CPS data 
(2004-2008), and in some cases, we use regional samples 
(i.e., pool states within a region). Even after pooling data, 
however, a state’s sample may still have few observations 
within one of the CPS detailed industries. In such cases, the 
data will less accurately reflect the types of workers in that 
industry. Specifically, in the clean-energy sector, “high school 
degree of less” workers will tend to be over-represented at the 
state level because they are more prevalent in the clean-
energy sector generally (see table 6 of the main report)—and 
t h u s  m o r e  l i k el y  t o  b e  i n c l u d ed  i n  a  g i v e n  s t a t e  s a m p l e  o f  
data. Similarly, college-degree workers will be under-
represented at the state level because they are less preva-
lent. This type of state-level bias in the data is weaker in the 
fossil fuels sector since workers in this sector are more evenly 
spread across the educational credential categories.  
The state estimates still provide valuable information on 
state-specific labor market characteristics. This is because all 
the state-level estimates will be somewhat inflated. As a re-
sult, the state estimates should still accurately identify which 
states have higher numbers of “high school degree or less” 
jobs relative to other states. Therefore, we can use the na-
tional figures to set the number of jobs by educational cre-
dential level across states—this will correct for the bias 
generated by state-level data, and then use the state figures 
to distribute these jobs within educational credential level 
across the states—to incorporate state-specific labor market 
characteristics. 
IMPACT ON LIVING STANDARDS FROM 
TRANSPORTATION SAVINGS 
We divide the over 300 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (or 
MSAs, as defined by the U.S. Census) into roughly three cate-
gories. The top 100 MSAs, we call high-density metropolitan 
areas. These MSAs range between 380 people per square 
mile to 13,000 people per square mile. Note that because 
MSAs span over more than one town or city, they can contain 
both rural and urban areas. The next 100 MSAs, we call me-
dium-density metropolitan areas. These MSAs range between 
200 people per square mile to 380 people per square mile. 
The remaining MSAs we refer to as low-density metropolitan 
areas. We then characterize the regional areas we analyze 
according to the MSA they contain. If a region does not con-
tain an MSA, it would be considered rural.  
We assume that public transit in medium to high density met-
ropolitan areas, particularly around urban centers, can be 
improved enough to allow significant numbers of low-income 
households to replace a car with public transit. For those 
households, they would achieve savings equivalent in magni-
tude to that estimated for the nation (see discussion above).  
We also assume that public transit in low-density metropolitan 
or rural areas cannot be improved sufficiently to allow signifi-
cant numbers of low-income households to replace a car with 
public transit. We assume that only some households may 
achieve significant savings from public transit improvements. 
However, living standards may still rise due to increased ac-
cess to employers and other resources outside their 
neighborhoods. 
For high-density areas where a high fraction of the population 
(i.e., more than 10 percent) already uses public transit (e.g., 
the New York metropolitan area), we estimate the cost sav-
ings by assuming a 50 percent price reduction in public tran-
sit fares and a mix of 25 percent of miles traveled by public 
transit and 75 percent of miles traveled by private transit. In 
other words we estimate how much a households overall 
transportation budget would decrease if they could receive 50 
percent fare discounts, and assuming that they currently use 
public transportation 25 percent of the time.  
We estimated above that without discounted public transit 
rates, the average overall transportation with the 75/25 mix 
would be equal to $2,977. When we reduce the public transit 
cost by 50 percent, from $0.22 per mile to $0.11 per mile, 
the overall transportation budget would be:  
    [(75% x 6,471 miles) x $0.54/mile] + 
[(25% x 6,471 miles) x $0.11/mile] = $2,799   
That is, the overall transportation budget would decrease 
from $2,977 to $2,799, or $178. This savings is equal to an 
average of about 0.9 percent of overall household spending.  
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OTHER DATA SOURCES 
1. Measures of overall economic activity:  
For congressional districts, the overall level of activity is esti-
mated directly by the IMPLAN 2.0 software and IMPLAN 2007 
data set constructed by the Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc. 
IMPLAN provides a measure of the total value added at the 
district level and includes the basic components of a district-
level GDP:  
  Employee compensation (wages, salaries, benefits) 
  Proprietor income (payments received by self-employed 
individuals and private businesses). 
  Other property income (payments from interest, rents, 
royalties, dividends, profits) 
  Indirect business taxes (excise and sales taxes paid by 
individuals to businesses) 
IMPLAN derives their data from the BEA's National Income 
and Product Accounts, and adjusts it to their sectorization 
pattern. 
For metropolitan areas, the BEA provides direct estimates 
annually. The latest figures are for 2006:   
www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_metro/ 
2008/pdf/gdp_metro0908.pdf (Accessed May 8, 2009). 
We adjust these IMPLAN 2007 figures and the BEA 2006 
figures using the regional BLS CPI-U.  
2. Percentage of renters and quality of housing stock: 
“Selected Housing Characteristics: 2005-2007,” from the 
American Community Survey U.S. Census Bureau: fact-
finder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_submenuId=factsh
eet_0&_sse=on (Accessed May 8, 2009). 
3. Public transportation use: 
“Selected Economic Characteristics: 2005-2007,” from the 
American Community Survey U.S. Census Bureau. Online: 
fact-finder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_submenuId= 
factsheet_0&_sse=on (Accessed May 8, 2009). 
4. Details on the local energy industry activity: 
“State Energy Profiles,” U.S. Department of Energy, Energy 
Information Administration, December 14, 2006. Online: 
tonto.eia.doe.gov/state (Last update: April 23, 2009;   
Accessed May 8, 2009). 
5. Details on the local climate conditions:  
“Monthly State, Regional, and National Heating Degree Days 
Weighted by Population (Includes Aerially Weighted Tempera-
ture and Precipitation,” U.S. Department of Commerce Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National 
Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service, May 
2009.  Online: www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/documentlibrary/hcs/ 
hdd.200707-200812.pdf (Accessed June 2, 2009). 
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